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ABSTRACT 
 
 What are environmental states, how do they form and where can they can be found? As 
ecosystems around the world collapse under the pressure of human activity, the role of the state 
is growing to include environmental protection as a key function. The concept of the 
environmental state has typically been applied to likely candidates in the developed world where 
wealth and relatively free public spheres have allowed for active environmental movements. It is 
increasingly clear however, that environmental degradation is disproportionately impacting states 
in the Global South. Because of this, it is necessary to consider whether or not environmental 
state formation can effectively occur in states with different economic, social and political 
contexts. Looking to China, a state which is infamous for problems such as air pollution, this 
study will show that environmental state development can take hold in such contexts. By 
comparing the Chinese case to that of Germany, this thesis will show that while there was no 
unified environmental movement in China that was able to affect significant change, similar 
outcomes were still reached. Specifically, underlying similarities found between the two states in 
regards to political legitimacy, international influences and processes of ecological 
modernization will provide an explanation as to why both states were able to achieve 
environmental state statuses despite their differences. In both cases, environmental concerns 
were effectively tied with the legitimacy imperative of the state which, in conjunction with 
developments at the international level, necessitated strong levels of ecological modernization to 
balance the environmental and economic goals of the states. This comparative analysis then 
provides useful insights into how signs of environmental state growth in other states of varying 
political and social contexts can be explained.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
I. Purpose and Goals of This Study 
Since the onset of the industrial revolution, the relationship between humankind and the 
natural world has been increasingly called into question. Naturally, this has led many to consider 
the role of the state in regulating this often contentious relationship. Assuming that state action is 
necessary to counter collective action issues, states around the world (to vastly different extents) 
have taken up the mantel of environmental protection and, in doing so, have added another 
dimension to perceptions on what a state is and should be. From this, the concept of the 
environmental state has been developed, described broadly as a state which internalizes 
environmental considerations into its core functions and institutions and, as a result, devotes a 
significant amount of resources towards these ends.1 Surrounding such conceptual advancements 
is the new study of comparative environmental politics (CEP), which comprises the, 
“…systematic study and comparison of environmental politics in different countries around the 
globe.”2 The main areas of concern within this body of research can be generally identified as 
social mobilization / non-state actors, political institutions / governance, values / culture / 
knowledge, and multilevel linkages.3 These categories offer starting points for comparative 
analysis of environmental politics in different states. With these aspects of CEP in mind, cases 
which represent significant developments in environmental politics can be effectively analyzed.   
Due to their impressive advancements as environmental states, Germany and China today   
                                                          
1 Meadowcroft, J. (2012). Greening the State? In P. F. Steinberg, Comparative Environmental Politics: theory,  
practice and prospects (pp. 63-87). Cambridge : MIT Press . 
2 “Comparative Environmental Politics in a Global World.” Comparative Environmental Politics, by Paul F. Steinberg and  
Stacy D. VanDeveer, MIT Press, 2012, pp. 3–27. 
3 “Bridging Archipelagos.” Comparative Environmental Politics, by Paul F. Steinberg and Stacy D. VanDeveer, MIT Press,  
2012, pp. 29-60. 
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offer two unique cases through which CEP can be exercised. The former provides a developed, 
post-industrial Western state with a well-established history of environmental protection while 
the latter displays a developing nation at the peak of industrial growth with relatively new 
environmental initiatives. At the same time however, both have emerged as dominant economic 
powers in their respective region and influential actors in the growing international 
environmental regime. It is because of these fundamental differences and similarities that China 
and Germany are the foci of this thesis; the clear distinctions and subtle parallels between these 
two states provide an excellent opportunity to better understand the various factors that lead to 
environmental state growth and offer a potential blueprint for other states both developed and 
developing.   
II. Methodology  
 In order to conduct a comparative analysis of environmental state development, the term 
“environmental state” must be clearly defined and understood. In the bourgeoning field of global 
environmental politics, the concept of an environmental state holds many connotations and is 
subject to a variety of perspectives. Therefore, a review of the current literature relating to these 
differing conceptions will be undertaken in order to find overlap and agreement on what 
fundamental characteristics constitute an environmental state. Although the basic idea of an 
environmental state was stated earlier, such broad terms offer only a general understanding of 
what an environmental state really is. It is critical to not only establish the basic understanding 
but also to clarify the specific characteristics and qualities. What measurements or benchmarks 
can be used in the pursuit of identifying and explaining environmental state development? 
Through a survey of some of the current literature on the topic, an answer to this question will be 
sought.  
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Following this literature review, the current status of both China and Germany as 
environmental states will be discussed. The various characteristics highlighted in the literature 
review that help to define the modern environmental state will be emphasized in each of these 
cases. As such, the ways in which Germany and China have both shown advancements in their 
respective legal frameworks, legislation, and bureaucracies will be considered. From this 
discussion, differences between the two states in the extent to which environmental state 
development has been achieved will be clear. It will be shown for instance, that in many ways 
China can still be considered a nascent environmental state, while Germany has proven to be 
further down the developmental path. Despite this, it will also be obvious that while there are 
significant differences between the two states, both China and Germany have made great strides 
in expanding the scope and strength of their environmental protection initiatives and that 
regardless of their differences, both have produced relatively similar results in regards to the 
types and scope of advancements made.   
The next step will be to explain why both states have succeeded in garnering 
environmental state statuses when they represent such different conceptions of statehood. Many 
would consider civil society to be an important factor in a study on environmental state 
development, as it seems only natural that strong environmental movements led by private 
citizens have been the main reasons for environmental progress within most states. This is 
evident, for example, in the German case where the prominence of NGO’s, research institutions, 
and other private groups has produced an effective national environmental movement. At the 
same time however, it will be shown that such a movement has been absent in China, as most 
forms of protest are scattered and localized, and most private organizations are heavily 
monitored and regulated by the state. In this way, civil society has not been a critical factor in 
9 
 
China’s path towards environmental state status. This then leads to the question that will be 
addressed by this thesis: given the clear lack of civil society in China, why has it been able to 
achieve in a relatively short period of time similar levels of environmental state development as 
did Germany? This also relates to the broader, more obvious differences between Germany and 
China in terms of their status as a free, democratic state and a repressive, authoritarian state 
respectively. How can similar outcomes be seen in such different political contexts? Other 
factors must be considered in order to explain the similarities in outcomes between these two 
states.  
 The first factor that will be studied is the underlying necessity of political legitimacy 
present in both Germany and China. Even though the authoritarian regime of the Communist 
Party in China differs greatly from the democratic regime and parliamentary system in Germany, 
the importance of legitimacy offers a common link between the two states. Any government, 
regardless of regime type, requires legitimacy in order to maintain power.4 Germany, as with 
many established democracies in the West, maintains legitimacy through its deep-seated, 
democratic institutions. For example, this is seen through the role of the various parties within 
the German political system, as they work to uphold broad public representation (and therefore 
public trust) in their democratic institutions.5 In contrast, authoritarian regimes such as China’s 
rely more on shallow and fickle attributes such as economic growth for their political authority to 
remain intact. Many in fact have argued that the political strength of the Communist Party in 
China is fading quickly, as the unprecedented economic growth experienced by the state in the 
past few decades is beginning to come to its inevitable end. As a result, the current regime in 
                                                          
4 Clawson, Rosalee A., and Eric N. Waltenburg. “Legitimacy and American Democracy.” Legacy and Legitimacy: Black  
Americans and the Supreme Court, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 2009, p. 3. JSTOR. 
5 Dalton, Russell J. "Chapter 8: The Party System and Electoral Politics." Politics in Germany. New York: HarperCollins  
College, 1993. 2-4. Print. 
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China must seek other means through which standards of living can be increased in order to 
preserve its political legitimacy and domestic order; in this way its attempts to improve 
environmental standards as a means of maintaining legitimacy, and the effects that this has had 
on pushing environmental state growth will be analyzed.6  
Likewise, it is important to take into account globalization and the role of each state in an 
international context. Both China and Germany represent today two powerful economic and 
political actors on the international scale. Consequently, their engagement internationally in 
trade, institutions, supranational organizations, etc. has in many ways affected the extent to 
which they have grown domestically as environmental states. The European Union (EU), for 
example, is active in environmental policy making and therefore, the influence it has over 
member states (such as Germany) is quite noteworthy.7 Similarly, China’s increasing integration 
into the global community through economic and political ties has opened it up to international 
pressures regarding environmental issues.  
 From a consideration of these two factors, we will begin to see how similarities between 
the two states have allowed similar outcomes to emerge. A dominant theme of these outcomes 
will be that of ecological modernization. Ecological modernization theory posits that sustainable 
economic growth and environmental protection efforts will become intertwined as green 
development and for this reason states will find it economically critical to pursue expanded 
environmental protection initiatives.8 As such, the theory will offer a unique lens through which 
the motivations behind heavy economic development, the passage of landmark legislation, and 
                                                          
6 Diamond, Larry. "The Coming Wave." Journal of Democracy 23.1 (2012): 10-13. Web. 
7 Kelemen, R. Daniel. “Regulatory Federalism: EU Environmental Regulation in Comparative Perspective.” Journal of Public  
Policy, vol. 20, no. 2, 2000, pp. 133–167. JSTOR 
8 Fisher, Dana R., and William R. Freudenburg. "Ecological Modernization and Its Critics: Assessing the Past and Looking  
Toward the Future." Society and Natural Resources 14.8 (2001): 702-03. Web. 
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other important factors in environmental state formation can be considered. Kicked off by efforts 
to maintain legitimacy and adapt to a changing international landscape, ecological modernization 
will then be seen to have, on its own, provided similar incentives towards environmental state 
growth in both states. In this way, while acknowledging the theory’s many critics, ecological 
modernization theory will be useful in analyzing the reasons for environmental state growth seen 
in both China and Germany.  
Using these theories as a guide, various metrics will be looked to in order to consider 
their explanatory value. Starting with political legitimacy, it will first be critical to more fully 
establish the ways in which environmental issues have become intertwined with the legitimacy 
imperative. In Germany, it will be shown that the strength of the environmental movement was 
in part responsible for this development, while in China it will be attributed to the unique nature 
of the state’s legitimacy. After this, policies implemented in both states that represent this new 
dynamic will largely be used in order to highlight the important role that legitimacy has played in 
their respective environmental state developments; how the policies have influenced public trust 
in government and institutions will be the primary considerations in this portion of the analysis. 
This will be accomplished through the exploration of various pathways that these policies offer 
through which public tensions can be eased and expectations can be met.   
 Following this, to underpin the analysis of international linkages and their influence on 
environmental state development, a variety of factors will be highlighted. For example, the 
requirements embedded in previously mentioned institutions and treaties must be considered in 
order to explain specifically how entry into such organizations as the EU or WTO has influenced 
the policies and structural changes that have been critical in building the German and Chinese 
environmental states. Likewise, international trade will similarly be highlighted in this portion of 
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the analysis. As with the measures used to outline the explanatory value of ecological 
modernization theory, the economic benefits of investing in environmental initiatives (such as 
green technology industries due to the expansion of foreign markets) will be considered in this 
section. Specifically, wind and solar technologies will be considered as these have been heavily 
invested in by both countries. In addition, the impacts of sanctions, wars, and general uncertainty 
in many oil producing regions have been shown to promote investment in green technologies, 
engagement in carbon markets, and the implementation of green standards into other forms of 
international engagement.9 As such, these dynamics will be a crucial element of this section. 
Turning to ecological modernization, policy will again be looked to in order to determine 
the effectiveness of this theory in explaining the rise of the environmental state in both cases. On 
top of policy however, other less obvious metrics will come into play. Rhetoric for instance will 
be a major consideration in this analysis. In this case, government officials such as Communist 
Party leaders in China and elected officials in Germany will be looked to in order to clarify 
motivations and highlight the influence of ecological modernization. For example, in their own 
words, how do decision makers in China explain the motivations behind an “ecological 
civilization”? Questions such as these will then be related to the specific developments which 
have been made that have pushed forward the growth of each nation as an environmental state. 
In this section, it will also be seen that ecological modernization, in its ability to help link 
environmental and economic concerns, merges these factors together into a single process; by 
undergoing ecological modernization, questions of legitimacy in both states can be answered and 
international pressures can be met.  
                                                          
9 Jaffe, Amy Myers. "Green Giant." Foreign Affairs. Foreign Affairs Magazine, 07 Dec. 2018. Web.  
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 With all this in mind, we will conclude first with a discussion on the major findings, in 
which this process will be explained in greater detail. Through this discussion, the possibility of 
similar outcomes in other developing states with currently few and/or weak environmental state 
characteristics will be addressed. In this way, the comparison of China and Germany will prove 
especially useful. As previously noted, the differences between the two states in terms of 
development and politics is striking and because of this, the fact that both can obtain comparable 
successes offers a glimpse of hope for many other nations struggling to grow in their own efforts 
to tackle environmental issues. It will be shown that despite the presence of stark divides, the 
underlying commonalities of political legitimacy, international influences, and ecological 
modernization can in any nation, help to produce environmental state effects. This is particularly 
relevant today as many other developing nations such as India and Brazil are following in the 
footsteps of China as they too undergo rapid industrialization and economic growth; these states 
are of course facing the same environmental degradation that plagues much of the world and 
must grow as environmental states in order to combat this threat as it worsens. By identifying the 
connections made between Germany and China, diverse states with different historical, societal 
and economic backgrounds can find common ground in their own fights to become successful 
environmental states with the capacities to confront issues ranging from air and water pollution 
to climate change.   
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Chapter 2: Germany and China as Environmental States 
I. Literature Review: What is an Environmental State?  
Framework for Environmental State Analysis  
First, we must clarify what is meant by an environmental state. As mentioned in the 
previous section, Meadowcroft has provided the basic definition of the concept. While this 
definition offers a useful conceptual outline, Andreas Duit’s work provides a more specific 
framework for comparative environmental state analysis. Moving beyond Meadowcroft’s basic 
definition of an environmental state, Duit defines an environmental state as a state that 
“possesses specialised administrative, regulatory, financial and knowledge structures that mark 
out a distinctive sphere of state activity, while the environment and the state’s role in managing 
social-environmental interactions has become a continuous focus of political argument and 
contestation”.10 By breaking down the environmental state into the administrative, regulatory, 
financial and knowledge structures that it encompasses, Duit identifies more specific indicators 
of environmental state status. These allow us to point to regulatory frameworks, bureaucratic 
organizations, funding for environmental related initiatives and projects or organizations that 
works to spread environmental awareness as our main environmental state indicators. These 
indicators make up Duit’s broader idea of an environmental governance regime (EGR), which he 
describes as being either established, emerging, partial, or weak.11  
Duit poses in the closing remarks of his study a few questions concerning questions left 
for further consideration. One of these is important to point out as it is especially relevant to our 
study. Considering why environmental states emerge, he points out that they do not necessarily 
                                                          
10 Duit, Andreas. "The Four Faces of the Environmental State: Environmental Governance Regimes in 28  
Countries." Environmental Politics 25.1 (2015): 69-91. Web. 
11 Ibid.  
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correlate with other comparative state characteristics, such as type of welfare state (liberal vs. 
social democratic), regime type (majoritarian democracy vs. consensual democracy), or even 
economic structure (centrally coordinated vs. liberal market).12 It is therefore, the purpose of this 
study to apply this analytical framework for environmental state comparative analysis to our 
cases in order to explain the similarities that exist in the face of significantly different 
backgrounds. In order to bolster our analysis, a more comprehensive review of the current 
literature relevant to the environmental state is offered below; this will help to provide more 
specific indicators of environmental state growth along the lines of Duit’s framework.   
Additional Points of Consideration 
  
 With this framework, a variety of other interpretations and applications of the 
environmental state concept will now be considered in order to identify other factors that can be 
helpful in applying Duit’s framework to our analysis. For example, John Barry holds a more 
progressive view of what this type of state ought to be and through his writings more specific 
qualities can be identified. While not directly using the term environmental state, he refers to a 
“green republicanism” in which he explains that sustainability driven politics are the norm. This 
type of politics is focused on human rights, socio-economic inequalities, environmental 
injustices, and a cap on economic development so that it does not use resources faster than they 
are replenished.13 Barry, building off of Robyn Eckersley’s work on the topic, describes a state 
dominated by this type of politics as “post-liberal, though not anti-liberal.”14 In this way, the 
green republic Barry envisions is a state that has moved beyond a capitalist, carbon based 
                                                          
12 Ibid.  
13 Barry, John. "Towards a Green Republicanism: Constitutionalism, Political Economy, and the Green State." The  
Good Society 17.2 (2008): 3-11.  
14 Ibid. p. 4 
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economy, while still upholding basic liberal tenants such as representative democracy and the 
rights and equality of individual citizens.  
While quite useful for forward thinking scholars attempting to imagine the state of the 
future, these qualifications for a “green republic” are for now quite quixotic and go beyond the 
basic concepts of what an environmental state today truly is. If Barry’s definition were used as 
the primary measure of an environmental state, very few states today, if any, would qualify. The 
United States for example has undoubtedly reached environmental state status, yet it has in no 
way moved past a carbon based, capitalist driven economy and consumerism is still a dominant 
force that continually triumphs over considerations of sustainability. However, while this piece 
seems to offer more in terms of what an ideal environmental state should look like in the future, 
it does provide specific qualifications of environmental state status that apply currently.  
For example, Barry points to a state’s constitution as a marker of environmental state 
development, “Given that constitutional provisions are among the most basic political structures 
of any society, the greening of the constitution is a potentially powerful mechanism for any 
transition away from unsustainability. Hence any change in the constitution in a green or 
sustainable direction could signal a profound shift in the political order.”15 Looking to a state’s 
constitution for clauses regarding environmental issues is a therefore useful means through 
which progress in environmental state development can be measured. This would relate to 
Meadowcroft in that environmental provisions in the constitution show that environmental 
considerations have become engrained in the core functions of the state, as the constitution of a 
state (as noted by Barry) is the most basic foundation of its political society.  
                                                          
15 Ibid.  
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Additionally, while discussing the nature of green politics, Barry highlights the 
importance of various factors such as an active citizenry, decentralized and democratized 
government, and a sense of justice between past present and future generations.16 Again, this 
analysis offers a mix of both quixotic and practical qualifications. An intergenerational sense of 
justice for instance is hard to measure or prove; the rhetoric of state leaders regarding various 
issues such as climate change could point to this, however it is not so concrete a factor that it can 
really aid in a more specified understanding of an environmental state. Looking for signs of an 
active citizenry and decentralization of environmental responsibilities is a more realistic goal.  
In contrast to this idealistic, post-liberal viewpoint, Peter Christoff attempts to use 
ecological modernization to go beyond defining the environmental state and to clarify the 
various types of environmental state that have taken shape.17 We will go further into the history 
and meaning of ecological modernization in following chapters but for now we can simply 
summarize it as a process through which environmental demands are met in a way that utilizes 
and is compatible with market forces; as such, it has been identified as a theory that can 
accommodate neo-liberal values and establish a positive sum relationship between market and 
environmental interests through a “pollution prevention pays” dynamic.18 While processes 
associated with neo-liberalism often imply a weakening of the state, Christoff believes that this is 
not necessarily the case with environmental issues as these issues require some type of 
centralized state response even if that response is matched by and compatible with increasing 
trends towards privatization.19  
                                                          
16 Ibid. p. 5 
17 Christoff, Peter. "Out of Chaos a Shining Star? Towards a Typology of Green States." The State and the Global Ecological  
Crisis. By John Barry and Robyn Eckersley. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2005. N. pag. Print. 
18 Hunold, Christian, and John Dryzek. "Green Political Strategy and the State: Combining Political Theory and  
Comparative History." The State and the Global Ecological Crisis. By John Barry and Robyn Eckersley. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT, 2005. 75-95. p. 83. Print. 
19 Ibid. p. xv 
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Using the historical development of Australia’s environmental policy as a case study, 
Christoff produces a typology for environmental state analysis in which environmental states can 
be categorized as Green States, Environmental Welfare States, Environmental Neoliberal States, 
or Ecofascist States; the classification depends on a few factors, most notably the state’s 
respective level of eco-modernization.20 Green States and Ecofascist states alike show strong 
levels of eco-modernization while Environmental Welfare and Environmental Neoliberal states 
are on the weaker end of the eco-modernization spectrum.21 While this particular typology will 
not be used for our study (Duit uses Christoff’s work as an influence for his own framework 
which is more effective and relevant), it introduces ecological modernization as an important tool 
to analyze environmental policy developments within states especially as a possible means of 
comparison. Christoff’s typology binds the varying types of environmental states together with 
ecological modernization despite all of the other differences that divide the states into their 
respective categories (levels of public participation, regime type, etc.).   
Moving on from a more theoretical examination of the environmental state, Carl Death  
explores environmental state qualities currently present in often overlooked African cases. Weak 
domestic institutions, lack of funding and generally poor environmental conditions tend to be 
commonly associated with African countries and because of this, they are not usually considered 
in analyses of environmental state formation. Despite this however, Death argues that through 
international forces and historical legacies, environmental state qualities can be considered 
present in many African cases as environmental management practices have produced state 
building effects in these areas. While this is not to say that these states have achieved 
                                                          
20 Ibid. pp. 42-43 
21 Ibid.  
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environmental state status, it certainly provides a unique study through which basic 
environmental state characteristics can be acknowledged.  
 To start, Death defines an environmental state as “...states in which the governance of 
environmental issues has become central and is closely linked to core imperatives of survival, 
maintenance of domestic order, generation of finance, capital accumulation and political 
legitimation…”.22 Though his definition is similar to Meadowcroft’s definition in that it is based 
off of the assumption that environmental considerations become intertwined with the core 
functions of the state, it highlights a few key points that are critical in narrowing down his own 
analysis of African states.  
For example, he explains how environmental initiatives in Africa aid in building state 
legitimacy. Through Death’s analysis, environmental state development does not necessarily 
have to be viewed as the process of states developing economically and socially before 
incorporating environmental concerns into their core functions; instead it can be viewed 
inversely, as environmental concerns (resource management, conservation, etc.) can aid in state 
creation before development takes hold economically, politically, etc. In the case of Africa, this 
is especially important as its long history of colonization disrupted the state building processes 
that many countries in Europe and North America experienced. Death points to various examples 
to support this claim, such as colonial Egypt in which colonial planers sought to improve both 
agricultural and waste management practices in order to create a more sustainable and productive 
colony. As a result of the enforcement of these initiatives, the colonial state began to establish 
itself,  “Through the supervision of hygiene and public health, the building of model villages, the 
construction of networks ‘to channel and control the movement of commodities, Nile waters, and 
                                                          
22 Death, Carl. “Green States in Africa: beyond the Usual Suspects.” Environmental Politics, vol. 25, no. 1, 2015, pp. 116–135. 
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tourists’, the surveillance of workers and ‘the opening up of towns and cities to continuous 
inspection with wide thoroughfares, street lighting and police forces’, the politics of the modern 
state in Egypt was produced.”23 
 Additionally, Death points to the importance of domestic order maintenance in 
environmental state analyses. In his view, environmental considerations can not only play a role 
in preserving domestic order but also in its initial establishment. The formation of nature 
preservations in African states offers an example of this. In many cases, the creation of these 
zones helps to define state boundaries and control internal state affairs. He notes the fact that 
only around a quarter of state borders in Africa are truly established as sovereign national 
boundaries.24 Despite this, funding from international groups such as the IMF, World Bank and 
World Wildlife Foundation helps to enforce the establishment and protection of wildlife 
preserves and national parks along with the fences, gates, tourist centers and other physical 
boundaries that come with them.25 In this way, Death claims that green state effects can be seen 
in Africa through the environmental initiatives that are closely intertwined with the core state 
imperative of establishing domestic order, as they (like in the case of these preserves) help to 
solidify state borders and the territory within them.  
 Lastly, green state qualities can be seen in African cases as environmental conservation 
and management practices aid in building state finances. The Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier 
Conservation Area is used as an example in this case. Death explains that this area, once fully 
established, will be the largest conservation area in the world and will be managed by multiple 
states as the area would cross over state borders (this would not minimize the effect of 
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strengthening borders mentioned in the previous paragraph as there would be restrictions on 
tourist movement between states within the area and would thus require closer scrutiny and 
monitoring of said borders).26 Money is a primary motivation for this initiative as, due to its size 
and scope, this area would surely be a major international tourist attraction and provide a large 
source of revenue for the states involved.27 In the context of Duit’s framework, Death’s idea of 
an environmental state fits as the state imperatives he specifies require an extensive array of 
financial, administrative, regulatory and knowledge structures; the cases of nature preserves 
points to this. Additionally, by tying environmental state development to the maintenance of 
political legitimacy, he clarifies a major incentive for government action in this respect which 
will act as the basis for one section of our study.  
Like Death, Yu-wai Li, Bo Miao and Graeme Lang delve into certain case studies that 
show signs of environmental state development. Uniquely however, this analysis focuses on 
cities and provinces and seeks to point out the ways in which the emergence of the 
environmental state in China has impacted local areas; this is important to consider as there 
remains a lack of enforcement of national environmental initiatives at the local level and, as a 
result, China’s environmental state status is not always reflected in local governance. While 
examples similar to this in the Chinese case will be further explored throughout this thesis, it is at 
this stage only important to focus on the markers this study uses to measure environmental state 
development at local levels.   
Similarly to Meadowcroft, the definition of an environmental state used by the authors is 
somewhat broad, “With an intellectual origin in environmental sociology, it refers to the state’s 
increasing involvement in managing and institutionalizing environmental tasks through state 
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policies.” … “...institutional changes which lead to internalization of environmental values and 
norms in social and policy processes.”28 The contribution of this study to the goal of a more 
operationalized environmental state definition is that it uses the standards set by the National 
Model City of Environmental Protection (NMCEP) to measure local level environmental state 
development. Adopted by the Chinese government in 1997, this model requires cities to undergo 
certain tests before they can achieve “model” status. First, a city must create an action plan for 
becoming a model environmental city and establish realistic programs for urban environmental 
management. Following this, the Ministry of Environmental Protection reviews the plan and 
then, if approved, opens up the plan for public access at which point citizens are able to voice 
any thoughts or concerns. After these steps are completed, the status of model city is officially 
granted and is held by the city so long as it passes the reassessment that takes place every three 
years.29 The authors then focus their study on cities that have achieved model city status and 
consider how they went about doing so and their subsequent influences on neighboring cities.  
A key takeaway from this study of provincial/city level adoption of NMCEP guidelines is 
that, for one thing, it points to the importance of an action plan for an environmental state. 
Whether it be specific goals for carbon emissions reductions or more comprehensive policies like 
the Obama administration’s Clean Power Plan (CPP), clear-cut plans for environmental progress 
are signs of environmental state formation. Additionally, this exemplifies the need for 
decentralization of environmental protection efforts. While there can be great strides made at the 
national level in building an environmental state, if these strides are not matched at the local 
level full environmental state status is questionable.   
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Shifting from a local level analysis to an internationally focused study, David Frank, Ann 
Hironaka and Evan Schofer take into consideration the creation of norms regarding 
environmental issues at the international level and the subsequent adoption of these norms within 
states; this in turn works to redefine the modern nation state and produce environmental state 
qualities from the top down, rather than from internal processes of development and 
modernization.30 The authors contend that between 1900 and 1995 states took on an 
unprecedented amount of responsibilities in terms of protecting and managing their natural 
environments. Looking to the creation of large, international organizations such as the United 
Nations and the United Nations Environment Programme in 1945 and 1972 respectively, 
noticeable spikes in state activity aimed at environmental protection can be seen around these 
times.31 Additionally, they point to such phenomena as the advent of environmental impact 
assessment laws which, after the United States passed its own in 1969, increased in number to 50 
states around the world in 1990.32 Examples such as these help to identify the role of 
international agenda setting in building the environmental state; in this way, IGO’s and lead 
states throughout the 20th century have helped to craft the modern environmental state through 
the creation and spread of norms.  
Specifically, five key indicators are highlighted to test this hypothesis, those being 
cumulative numbers of national parks and protected areas, chapters of international 
environmental nongovernmental associations, state memberships in intergovernmental 
environmental organizations, environmental impact assessment laws, and the creation of national 
environmental ministries. The authors assert that through the measurement of these factors, the 
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degree to which states have adopted environmental concerns into their core functions during the 
20th century can be determined, “Taken together, the five indicators suggest an important 
reconstitution of the nation-state form: The nation-state has become environmentalized as a 
whole set of policies, once practically invisible in state organizations, now appears to be de 
rigueur.”33 These indicators, in conjunction with factors mentioned in the other articles, thus help 
to more specifically identify and define an environmental state and its core qualities. Most 
importantly however, these authors add an international dimension to the conversation by 
highlighting the critical influence that international forces have in building the environmental 
state. Like the argument regarding political legitimacy, we will consider this further in following 
chapters as a main point of concern.   
Conclusion  
 So what exactly is an environmental state? As explained by Meadowcroft, it is a state in 
which environmental concerns are included among the core functions and as a result a significant 
amount of resources are devoted to managing those concerns. Duit offers a more operationalized 
view as previously explained, through his framework composed of regulatory, administrative, 
financial and knowledge based structures. Additionally, a common theme among the other 
studies references was the devolvement of environmental concerns to local level governments. In 
this way, the internalization of environmental concerns that marks an environmental state must 
also be reflected, at least to some extent, throughout the governmental system, rather than only in 
the functions of the central government. Furthermore, we can look to death’s interpretation for 
more specificity on the idea of environmental concerns as core state functions, as he unites 
environmental concerns with revenue production. Taking these factors into consideration, a more 
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comprehensive definition of an environmental state could be as follows: a state in which 
environmental concerns are included among and closely related to core state functions through 
administrative, regulatory, financial and knowledge based apparatus which are influential at both 
the national level and local level in the state.  
 Along with this amended definition are the specific measures pointed to in the literature. 
First, as explained by Barry, at the foundation of a state’s political system is its constitution and 
because of this, clauses relating to environmental protection should be present in an 
environmental state, as this would be a sign of true internalization of environmental concerns. 
Furthermore, from the study of environmental state development at the local level in Chinese 
cities, the importance of an action plan for environmental progress is noted and can reflect the 
formation of the environmental state both at the national level and its acceptance locally 
throughout a country. Lastly, we can see through the work of Death and Frank ET. Al. the 
importance of physical landmarks such as national parks as signs of environmental state growth 
along with such state characteristics as environmental protection agencies, national 
environmental action plans and the acceptance of international environmental norms in 
identifying and explaining environmental state growth. By using indicators such as these and in 
line with Duit’s environmental state framework, the establishment of new laws, bureaucratic 
agencies, research programs and data on government spending will be explored throughout this 
study. First, an overview of some of the major environmental state advancements in both states is 
necessary so that we will have some general context moving forward.  
II. Germany as an Environmental State 
Introduction  
 Following this analysis of an environmental state definition, the focus can now be placed   
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specifically on the two states of concern in this study. Between Germany and China, it is only 
natural to start with the German case as China’s path towards environmental state development 
started more recently and is arguably incomplete. Germany, on the other hand, provides a more 
obvious example to which the amended definition and measures identified in the previous 
section can be applied.  
 Furthermore, it will be useful to conduct this application in a chronological manner. 
Starting from the creation of the modern German state in the post-WWII era, the internalization 
of environmental concerns within German institutions and society will be followed in order to 
highlight the successive advances that have produced the conditions seen today. This will be 
done by focusing on developments made in Germany’s legal framework, government, and 
society over time. It is important to note that each of these areas overlap with one another and 
that a development in one may be the result of a development in another. The developments 
highlighted will focus on those identified in the previous section, namely constitutional and legal 
provisions, legislation, local and/or national action plans, and landmarks such as national parks; 
the effects of these qualities on state legitimacy, revenue production, and the devotion of 
resources by public and private groups will be considered. By highlighting these developments 
and the ways in which they fit into the environmental state definition, Germany’s path towards 
environmental state status definition will be shown.  
The Greening of German Law  
The evolution of the German environmental state began after the Second World  
War when the Allied Powers began working to rebuild the local and central governments of the 
state. While there was previously a longstanding tradition of conservation laws in Germany 
regarding activities such as fishing, hunting and forest management, these laws had more 
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practical, economic considerations in mind and were not necessarily cases of explicit 
environmental protection; it was not until the post-war rebuilding period that developments in 
the German legal framework which allowed for environmental state development were 
established.34 
 This was first seen in the creation of the new German constitution, known as the “Basic 
Law”. Originally drafted in 1948 by the Prime Ministers of the Länder in the West, this 
document became the law of the land for the entire German state after reunification in 1990.35 As 
the name suggests, and as Barry mentioned in his commentary on “Green Constitutionalism”, 
this provides the most basic legal and political structure of a nation. As such, it is important to 
look to this document not necessarily to prove that Germany is in fact an environmental state, but 
rather to show that the fundamental legal and political structure of the state provides the capacity 
and lays the groundwork for such development. In this way, an inquiry into the environmental 
provisions (or lack thereof) embedded in a state’s constitution is a good first step in identifying 
environmental state characteristics.  
 In Germany’s case, the constitution at various points specifies environmental protection 
as a responsibility of the state. In 1972 for example, the government amended the constitution in 
order to grant the federal government the power to establish legislation regarding air pollution;36 
this power is seen in the section identifying concurrent legislative powers (powers that fall to the 
states when not exercised by the federal government). Article 74 of the Basic Law includes in its 
list of these powers, “24. Waste disposal, air pollution control, and noise abatement...29. 
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Protection of nature and landscape management…” along with other measures such as oversight 
of water resources.37 These powers are included with other measures such as public welfare and 
therefore show the development of environmental protection as basic social responsibilities (like 
public welfare) and more than simply practical considerations of resource management. While 
the inclusion of such clauses into the national constitution on their own do not qualify Germany 
as an environmental state, however, as previously stated, it shows the rise of environmental 
considerations at the most fundamental level of state politics and law.  
 On top of the constitutional provisions which worked to embed environmentalism in 
German law, the legal system itself and the expanded opportunities for environmentally focused 
public interest litigation reflects the growth of Germany as an environmental state. While the 
1970’s saw an increase in environmental activism amongst the people and awareness within the 
government, enforcement of legislation was still inadequate. In an attempt to strengthen the 
public’s role as a watchdog, the government opened up access to the courts. Previously, it was 
nearly impossible to obtain legal standing to sue for violations of environmental law on behalf of 
the public as it was often unclear whether or not there was a direct injury against the Plaintiff. 
Looking to the legal system in the United States for inspiration, Germany updated its own by 
easing the qualifications for legal standing in representing the public interest to certain, approved 
associations; while a step forward, this was still more restrictive than the American system as it 
gave the government greater discretion over which groups this applied to and which legal actions 
could be pursued. However, in order to further expand access to the courts, Germany passed in 
2006 the Environment Action Act (Umwelt-Rechtsbehelfsgesetz), which allowed associations to, 
in certain circumstances, defend specific individuals whose rights have been violated by any 
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insufficient protections of the environment, as beforehand legal actions were limited to 
defending the public environmental interest in general.38 Such changes to German law exemplify 
the growing importance of the environment in increasing domestic order through the creation of 
legal outlets to pursue environmental justice.  
The Greening of German Government  
Overlapping with the internalization of environmental considerations in German laws  
is the development of this phenomenon in Germany’s government and bureaucracy. Between 
1970 and today, much progress in this regard has been made. Looking to Germany’s government 
as a whole for example, the major parties today offer little disagreement on the fundamental 
importance of environmental protection and conservation, representing a general acceptance of 
the inclusion of the environment into the core functions of the state.39 This acceptance is 
reflected throughout the various governance levels and bodies within the state.  
 Looking back to the 1960’s and 70’s, Germany lacked both comprehensive 
environmental regulations and strong bureaucratic structures to enforce them. 40 This began to 
change in the early 1970’s with the creation of the Environmental Expert Council 
(Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen – SRU) in 1972 and the Federal Environmental Agency 
(Umweltbundesamt – UBA) in 1974. Both the UBA and the SRU were founded in order to aid 
the government with scientific and policy advice. Additionally, this trend continued in 1986 
when the Federal Ministry of the Environment (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und 
Reaktorsicherheit – BMU) was established, largely taking over the role of the Interior Ministry 
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which had been overseeing the enforcement of environmental policy, offering a larger number of 
employed scientists and greater expertise.41  
 Bureaucratic growth has also been seen at the local level in Germany. Germany is similar 
to the United States in that it maintains a federalist system with certain powers relegated to the 
states. In this way, the states have also played in important role in the creation of various bodies 
aimed at aiding the implementation of environmental protection initiatives; the state of North 
Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) offers an excellent example of this. For example, the state created an 
energy agency (Energieagentur) in order to aid the state and local utilities with scientific advice 
and technological support. 42 The development of agencies such as these at both the national and 
regional level offers concrete manifestations of the increase in resources being devoted to 
environmental issues in Germany, and shows that the internalization of environmental protection 
as a key government function has occurred in Germany not only at the top but in the local 
governments as well. 
 These advances in bureaucratic structure have been matched politically, as the rise of the 
Green Party and the increase in environmental awareness among the other major parties have 
taken hold. The Green Party for instance rose to national significance in 1983 when it achieved 
representation in Parliament after significant environmental issues such as acid rain mobilized 
the German population in support for Green candidates. As will be discussed in greater detail 
later, the rise of the Green Party in Germany subsequently forced the more mainstream CDU and 
SPD to take stronger stances on environmental protection, as was seen by the passage of 
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landmark legislation such as the Large Combustion Plant Directive of 1983 during Helmut 
Kohl’s conservative leadership.43 
 As such, Germany has surpassed many states in the scope and effectiveness of its 
environmental protection legislation. German legislation regarding stationary air pollution 
control for example, is considered to be some of the strongest examples of such legislation in the 
world.44 The passage of the Federal Emissions Control Act (Bundes-Immissionsschutzgeset) in 
1974 required that any facilities producing emissions which had the potential to produce negative 
environmental effects must obtain a permit. The law identifies almost 100 emissions that, if 
produced by a facility, would require a permit to be obtained. With such a permit, the amount of 
emissions produced as well as the disposal of any harmful wastes is heavily regulated; while 
measures such as these are similar to those found in other states such as the US, Germany’s go 
further in their designation of disposal methods for related industrial wastes, along with the 
scope of air pollutants that it covers under the emissions guidelines for permitted firms.45 
 Furthermore, Germany typically has tended more towards command and control 
legislation than other states such as the UK, which often opt more for voluntary agreements. This 
was especially seen in the development of its regulatory framework regarding pesticides. The 
first of such legislation came in 1968 with the Pesticide Act, followed by its amended version in 
1986 with the Plant Protection Act, in addition to a plethora of other laws that were passed 
including the 1972 Act on DDT and the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1980. 46 At the same 
time, these command and control regulations have been accompanied by voluntary programs 
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issued by the Länder. These agri-environmental schemes offer funding and incentives for 
farmers who agree to comply to certain standards; 91 of the 104 voluntary agri-environmental 
scheme programs present in Germany by 1992 were primarily concerned with environmental 
protection and set their standards accordingly.47 This offers yet another example of the varying 
levels of governance relevant to the German environmental state.  
 However, as mentioned earlier, the federal government in Germany is constitutionally 
able to exercise at times more direct control over its local municipalities than in, for example, the 
United States. Therefore, the dynamic between the federal government and the states in Germany 
is clearly a give and take of both regional autonomy and federal oversight rather than a 
straightforward system of broad objectives established at the top and a veritable free for all by 
the states in their individual pursuits of these objectives. In this way, it has been able to issue 
strong federal guidelines that must be followed at the local level. These are seen in the Building 
Law Book (Baugesetzbuch—BauGB) and the Building Use Ordinance 
(Baunutzungsverordnung— BauNVO), which specify various standards for the municipalities in 
their local planning initiatives. These regulations outline various requirements set forth by the 
federal government for city planning policies created by the municipalities; in addition to 
specific rules regarding how land is used, they require that local governments must take the 
effects on climate change into consideration in their city planning activities.48 
Additionally, the permeation of policy advancements made at the national level down to 
the local Länder level in Germany can be seen through the adoption of Agenda 21. The 
formation of Agenda 21 at the Rio Earth Summit in the early 1990’s brought with it the push for 
not only national action plans regarding sustainable development but also the establishment of 
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local initiatives. Through the diffusion of Agenda 21 throughout the German states, 
environmental state development can be seen to have become prevalent throughout the country, 
rather than having remained superficially pursued at the top. For example, by 2006 2,610 local 
authorities had established commitments to implementing their own A21 plans. While some 
Länder were less ambitious than others, Hesse, Saarland and NRW were able to boast that over 
60% of their local authorities had committed to A21 resolutions.  
These efforts pulled a significant amount of financial and human resources; in Berlin 
alone €600,000 every year went towards 48 “coordinators” throughout the city to oversee the 
implementation of the development plans. While this number was eventually cut, a central 
Agenda Office was maintained with staff to oversee these operations, along with a Public 
Working Group and Agenda Forum in order to ensure communication between the boroughs of 
the city.49 The diffusion of Agenda 21, in addition to the other examples of policy 
implementation mentioned in this section, show the spread of financial commitment and 
government attention throughout the German state rather than only at the top. This exemplifies 
the qualities of an environmental state as the characteristics must be reflected throughout the 
political society of a country, both locally and nationally.  
Conclusion 
While these developments surely do not provide an all-encompassing account of   
Germany’s path towards environmental state status, they are meant to highlight the general trend 
that has been exhibited from the post-WWII decades into the 21st century. Specifically, what 
these developments show is that environmental concerns have become intertwined in Germany 
with core state functions and that this trend has been occurred not only at the national level but 
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has also been reflected in the state governments and the general population. For instance, the 
greening of the Basic Law shows acceptance of environmental protection as a primary 
responsibility of the state. While only a basic step forward, the creation of the various 
bureaucratic bodies mentioned offer more concrete manifestations of the increased attention and 
resources devoted to the environment at the national level.  
The rise of the Green Party and its influence on the other major parties adds to this, as it 
sheds light on the growing relationship between the environmental movement and government 
legitimacy, as the conservative leadership at the time felt obligated to take relatively strong 
environmental stances in order to maintain power. Likewise, the local action plans adopted under 
Agenda 21 exemplify this trend at the local levels. As such, Germany can be considered an 
established environmental state, with its long history of environmental initiatives and the 
relatively successful implementation of these initiatives throughout the state.  
III. China as an Environmental State  
Introduction  
Coming off the German case, it is clear that for a country to build up the capacity,  
institutions and social awareness necessary to achieve environmental state status it takes a 
considerable amount of time and resources. As such, China offers an interesting follow up, given 
its relatively recent rise in economic and political power. Much of the environmental progress it 
has made has come only recently and certainly has not yet solved the many environmental 
challenges currently facing the state; overpopulation, its reliance on manufacturing, and the 
impending effects of climate change all still loom over China, as it struggles to maintain a 
balance between modernization and environmental degradation. This then leads to the question: 
to what extent has China experienced the growth of environmental considerations in its 
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regulatory framework, bureaucracy, and financial commitments? While it is obvious that the 
state has shifted much of its attention towards combating its extensive environmental issues, it is 
less clear whether or not this has resulted in the fundamental changes that differentiate between 
environmental states and non-environmental states.  
 China is, according to some, only a nascent environmental state, as their many recent 
environmental initiatives still struggle with implementation and compliance.50 These weaknesses 
are important to consider, especially in relation to Germany, where the internalization of 
environmentalism was seen to permeate all levels of society, instead of simply rest at the top. At 
the same time however, China has considerably increased its devotion of state funds towards 
environmental protection; by 2014, the government had committed 277 billion dollars to fight air 
pollution and 333 billion dollars to fight water pollution and now spends more than any other 
country on renewable energy development (as we will see in following chapters).51 Such funding 
implies an expansion of the government’s capacity to administer and oversee these initiatives. 
Therefore, as was done with Germany, some of the more significant changes made by the 
Chinese government to increase its own legal and administrative capacities in order to effectively 
build its environmental protection apparatus will be described.   
The Greening of Chinese Law  
As with Germany, China’s path toward environmental state status can be seen first in its  
constitutional and legal frameworks, as these provide the governmental and societal capacities 
required to successfully push for increased attention and resources towards environmental 
protection. It is because of this that a brief overview of the environmental provisions present in 
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the Chinese constitution and the inclusion of environmental considerations within Chinese law is 
warranted. Beginning with the constitutional provisions, 1978 saw changes made to the 
constitution that included references to environmental concern.52 These concerns can be seen in 
Article 26 of the General Principles, which states, “The state protects and improves the living 
environment and the ecological environment, and prevents and controls pollution and other 
public hazards. The state organizes and encourages afforestation and the protection of forests.” 
As with the German case, what these developments represent is the foundation of China’s legal 
capacity to act on the environment and an acceleration in the efforts of the state to tackle its 
mounting environmental issues.53 
 Furthermore, as in Germany’s, there have been many developments in China’s legal 
system which have aided in increasing the importance of environmental protection in China. For 
example, between 2007 and 2013, 130 environmental courts were established throughout the 
nation; these courts work to provide the public with an outlet through which environmental 
disputes can be resolved. Courts in general help to strengthen state legitimacy through their 
ability to reduce tensions and provide redress.54 On top of this advancement, public interest 
litigation related to environmental issues became permitted by the central government in 2015.55 
Through developments such as these, the expansion of the legal system within China to 
accommodate the growth of environmental considerations within society has provided a 
necessary foundation for environmental state growth. On top of this, these changes to Chinese 
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law highlight the growing ties between environmental protection, domestic order, and 
government legitimacy, which are key aspects of the environmental state definition. 
The Greening of Chinese Government  
The Chinese government has likewise, taken many steps towards improving its  
bureaucratic and legislative capacity for environmental protection. While it was relatively late to 
the game in this respect, it has devoted in the past few decades many resources towards 
expanding its bureaucracy and increasing the strength of its environmental policies. The 
intentions of the government to catch up with other modern nations in their environmental 
standards was seen clearly in 2003 when then President Hu Jintao announced that environmental 
protection would be on par with economic development for the Chinese government moving 
forward.56 On top of the increased rhetoric by Communist Party officials emphasizing the 
growing importance of environmental protection in state activities, environmental considerations 
have clearly started to take on central positions in the Communist Party’s various plans for 
development and modernization. This was seen recently in 2015 when the CPC released an 
“ecological reform plan”, which was specifically crafted in order to comprehensively improve 
the systems for ecological restoration and conservation that were at that time in place. This 
reform plan included such provisions as the official protection of virgin forests, grasslands and 
wetlands, under which protection any unauthorized uses of such lands would be banned. In 
addition to these protections, the plan highlighted key goals revolving around increasing revenue 
production from public land use, as it explains that pricing for the use of public lands will 
increase in order to reduce the percentage of public lands being utilized for industrial purposes; 
likewise, the plans targets increases in the scope of taxation for resource extraction and use in 
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order to increase regulation of various industries and improve revenue streams.57 The inclusion 
of environmental protection into the developmental action plans of the Chinese central 
government goes back much further however, as seen in the five-year action plans which 
highlight the main developmental goals and policies the PRC wishes to pursue moving 
forward.58  
There have been, between 1953 and 2015, twelve five-year plans; an analysis of each of 
the plans shows the trend of the growth of environmental considerations within the central 
government in China. The first five five-years plans (1953-1980) were focused on establishing 
minimum energy production goals through increasing the availability of such resources as coal 
and oil however, by the sixth five-year plan (1981- present), energy efficiency and a reduction in 
energy usage per unit of production became primary goals of the plans; the environmental 
considerations within the plans were advanced with the eleventh-five year plan and the plans 
afterwards (2006-present) in which targets of sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide emissions 
became prevalent along with an increased focus on the development of renewable energy 
production. For example, the twelfth five-year plan called for a 17% reduction of carbon dioxide 
emissions per unit of GDP, and a goal of 11.4% and 20% of total energy consumption being 
from renewable sources by 2015 and 2020 respectively. Goals such as these in recent five-year 
plans represent the increased importance of environmental protection and its now equal footing 
with other state mandates like economic growth and social stability which previously dominated 
the focus of the plans.59  
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 The heightened environmentalism witnessed within the rhetoric and action plans of the 
central government of China can also be seen within the bureaucratic growth China has 
achieved. This process was first seen in the 1970’s at the national level with the creation of the 
Environmental Protection Office (EPO). While China attempted to follow other nations in 
establishing an organization within the central government focused on environmental protection, 
their version lacked any real power or resources, as was seen by its inability to issue any direct 
orders to lower level bureaucratic organizations. The actual expansion of bureaucracy was not 
seen until 1979 as local environmental agencies were granted more power; this eventually 
resulted in the creation of the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) 60 in 1998 and the 
upgrade of this organization to the cabinet level in 2008, officially becoming the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP).61 The growth in environmental bureaucracy in China as a 
whole can also be seen through the size of its staff, which has grown considerably since the early 
1990’s. In 1995 for example, environmental bureaucracy in China was comprised of a staff of 
88,000 people, while by 2004 over 160,000 were employed.62 This growth extended down to the 
provincial level, as sub-provincial environmental protection bureaus (EPB’s) have been 
established in an effort to ensure compliance with the national policies. It is through the 
weakness of these EPB’s however, that a key problem in China’s environmental protection 
efforts can be identified; the sub-provincial EPB’s generally lack much power and have a hard 
time countering the local governments, which are focused mainly on economic development and 
lack the environmental consciousness of the central government.63 This complicates China’s rise 
                                                          
60 Hess, p. 49.  
61 Shapiro, p. 68 
62 Mol, Arthur P. J.  & Neil T. Carter. “China's environmental governance in transition.” Environmental Politics,  
15:02, (2006): 152 
63 Li, p. 118 
40 
 
as an environmental state, as it shows that the changes made at the top are not always reflected 
throughout the state.  
 Naturally leading from the development of environmental bureaucracy is the 
implementation of policy. For the most part, China has offered a much more top-down approach 
to environmental state building than was seen in Germany. Its environmental initiatives have 
been described as heavy handed and ignorant of social ramifications; the forced relocation of 
ethnic minorities in the grasslands of Tibet in order to stop land degradation caused by herding 
offers a perfect example of this as the Chinese government has relocated countless people in the 
name of ecological restoration.64 As with the bureaucracy, the growth of environmental policy 
largely came in 1979 with the establishment of the Environmental Protection Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, which sought in many ways to work environmental protection into 
the role of agencies such as the Ministry of Construction, and embedded some of the first 
environmental requirements into the economic growth of the state as it introduced environmental 
impact assessments, pollution discharge fees, and the requirement that pollution control 
measures be intertwined with the design, construction and operation phases of any development 
projects. This was followed by the Environmental Impact Assessment Law in 2004 which 
requires developers to receive permission from the MEP before beginning any new projects. 
Significant changes were also made to the environmental protection laws in 2015 which establish 
various improvements to the old legislation including the requirement that projects be more 
closely tied in with environmental protection efforts and the establishment of stronger financial 
penalties for violators.65  
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 Much more can be written on the efforts of the central government in China to improve 
its record on environmental protection. It is true that the divide between the central and local 
governments has limited the progress that could have been achieved. Despite this, the vast 
expansion of China’s environmental bureaucracy and policy, along with the newfound presence 
of environmental concerns in national development plans and CPC rhetoric provide concrete 
examples of qualities mentioned in the environmental state definition; the internalization of 
environmental issues within government functions, along with the rise of environmental 
protection to become intertwined with such key state responsibilities as revenue production have 
been highlighted in these governmental advances.  
Conclusion  
From this analysis, the idea of a weak or emerging environmental state seems to best  
describe the case of China. While China has in many ways showcased the same results as 
Germany in terms of its legislative and bureaucratic advancements, these have largely been led 
by the central government’s top down approach to environmental progress. The increased 
devotion of government resources towards environmental considerations, as manifested in these 
policy initiatives and bureaucratic expansion, shows the rise of environmental protection as a 
core state function. Likewise, the rise of environmental issues within the various development 
plans published by the central government highlights the same trend in the greening of the 
Chinese state.  
At the same time, as explained in our environmental state definition, this trend must be 
reflected throughout society, rather than only at the top. Despite the promising advancements 
made by the Chinese government, implementation and compliance at local levels still plague the 
many environmental initiatives that have been attempted. While this offers a sobering view of 
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China’s environmental state, I would argue that it is still an environmental state nonetheless, due 
to the previously mentioned advances. China has built up a significant legal and administrative 
capacity and is increasingly investing more and more state funds towards environmental issues. 
With this established, it is now important to consider the overarching question: why? Why has 
China been able to match Germany in achieving this status when, on the surface, the state differs 
so significantly?  
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Chapter 3: Civil Society as a Casual Factor 
I. Introduction 
With our understanding of an environmental state established and our overview of  
Germany and China in the context of this concept complete, we must now move on to address 
the main questions of this thesis. Specifically, why have both achieved relatively similar results? 
In order to answer this question, we will compare major themes important to each state in order 
to identify any overlap and underlying similarities that have caused the same processes to occur 
and outcomes to be achieved. To start this comparison, it is important to consider the strength 
and effectiveness of civil society. Common notions of the environmental state point to its origins 
in civil society. The narrative is often that rising standards of living lead to the growth of 
environmental considerations among the public, and that this then produces a bottom-up, 
grassroots process through which political and economic advancements result in the 
environmental state. Due to the history of the environmental movement in the United States, this 
belief is not surprising. With the release of Rachel Carson’s “Silent Spring”, a rise in public 
support for a government response to environmental issues took hold and many have pointed this 
as the origin of modern American environmental policy. As the book produced a passionate and 
engaged populace and as activists such as Carson herself testified before Congress, a 
strengthened civil society produced a strengthened regulatory and administrative advancements 
to deal with such issues as pesticide use.66  
As such, the rise of an environmentally conscious civil society seems to be the first point  
that we should consider in this study. Through our comparison, we will attempt to show whether 
or not similar processes have occurred in both Germany and China. To do so, the current state of 
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each nation’s environmental civil society will be described along with any influence that they 
may have had on domestic environmental advancements. Following these overviews, the 
implications of this chapter’s findings for the remainder of this thesis will be considered by 
highlighting any key differences and / or similarities found between the roles that civil society 
has been able to play in each state. Through this analysis, we will show that while civil society 
has been allowed to grow in Germany, the repressive nature of the Chinese state has prevented 
such an outcome within Chinese society. As the main finding of this chapter, this fundamental 
difference will help to augment the research questions of this thesis and frame the argument 
moving forward.  
II. Environmentalism in German Society 
An Environmental Movement in Germany 
Traditionally, there has been a strong history of environmental stewardship and an  
emphasis on sustainable practices in Germany, especially in regards to forest management and 
conservation practices.67 Despite this, it was not until the 1970’s that much of the progress 
Germany has made in truly internalizing environmental concerns within its population has been 
seen. Prior to this time, concern for environmental issues was quite weak, however, the advent of 
issues such as nuclear power and acid rain, along with the manifestation of their potential 
consequences in Chernobyl and forest damage respectively, mobilized portions of the population 
that had not previously been engaged.68  
 As a result of the heightened awareness, the rise of political groups such as the Green 
Party was also reflected within civil society as a variety of different activist organizations began 
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to form. In contrast to states like Japan, the development of these organizations and the onset of 
environmental activism in general in Germany took on a national importance that went beyond 
regional and local movements, as groups such as NGO’s grew in national membership, 
resources, and influence. German groups such as the Climate Alliance (Klimabündnis), along 
with German chapters of international groups like Greenpeace boasted relatively high levels of 
membership, staff and income, at least compared to Japan and other states where NGO’s are less 
important actors in the decision making processes regarding state functions such as policy 
creation. By 2002 for example, Greenpeace had 510,000 members in Germany while the Climate 
Alliance had 450 (though seemingly small, the Climate Alliance is a local NGO without the 
international recognition of Greenpeace). Additionally, Greenpeace and the Climate Alliance 
maintained 120 and 14 staff members respectively and annual incomes of 32.9 million and 1 
million euros. Due partially to these resources and their position within an environmental 
movement national in scope, NGO’s in Germany enjoy an influential seat in the policy making 
process.69  
Likewise, Germany maintains a strong body of independent research organizations meant 
to bolster the national environmental movement. An example of this was seen through the 
creation of research groups such as the Öko-Institut in 1977. Groups such as these worked to 
provide expertise to other organizations regarding environmental science and law. Their efforts 
were augmented by the creation of the Working Coalition of Institutes of Ecological Research 
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft ökologischer Forschungsinstitute – AGÖF) in 1986 which helped bring 
these types of groups together in order to better coordinate their efforts at the national level. 70 
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The Öko-Institut and the umbrella organization of the AGÖF represent in Germany a thriving 
body of research institutes which work independent of government units and interest groups. 
Making the comparison again to Japan, where research institutes and think-tanks are often 
closely intertwined with the government and only work to augment the positions already held by 
bureaucratic agencies, Germany offers a more robust mix of environmental groups as seen by the 
strength of its independent research bodies.71 These types of groups underwent significant 
growth in the 1980’s. Looking to the more medium sized groups such as the Öko-Institut for 
example, significant membership increases between 1985 and 1993 represent the development of 
a more active civil society. The Öko-Institut saw a 20% increase in membership during this 
timeframe while another group, the Verkehrsclub Deutschland (which did not exist in 1985) 
increased its membership from 31,000 in 1989 to 63,000 in 1992.72 The growth and influence of 
research groups and NGO’s such as these in Germany highlights the growing devotion of 
resources made by the public to environmental organizations and a growth in environmental 
consciousness within civil society. 
 On top of this growth, the general perceptions of the German population as a whole 
regarding the environment is important to consider. Using Eurobarometer data, it can be seen 
that environmental considerations have truly embedded themselves within the populace. For 
example, data published in 2017 shows that a vast majority of Germans consider environmental 
protection as either “very important” (54%) or “fairly important” (40%) to them personally. 
Furthermore, going back to 2002, 56% of people believed that their individual actions could 
make a difference in the protection of the environment;73 while remaining relatively stable, this 
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number increased to 58% in 2017. The 2017 data also showed that 86% of Germans are worried 
about the impact of plastic goods on the environment, as compared to only 13% that do not 
worry.74 Data such as these show a widespread acceptance amongst German people of the 
importance of environmental protection along with at least a general understanding of the current 
issues at hand.  
 The trend of greater environmental consciousness in German society also manifested 
itself in the creation of national parks. Prior to the establishment of national parks, West 
Germany sought to meet the increasing demands of its citizens for more access to natural spaces 
and public open areas. This started with the nature park program in West Germany which 
worked to establish 26 parks across the country by 1963; this number increased to 53 by 1970 
and expanded to cover almost 15% of land area in West Germany.75 Conservationist movements 
continued to grow however, and pressures from notable public figures such as Bernhard Grzimek 
(well known for his work in both conservation and television) eventually led to the establishment 
of the country’s first national park in the Bavarian Forest in 1970. Despite opposition to the 
establishment of the park, the promise of increased tourism and the subsequent revenue and jobs 
that it would produce aided in its eventual acceptance.76 Since then, 15 more national parks have 
been established around the country, including two recently in 2014 and 2015; in total these 
parks cover about 1047859 hectares of land.77 Looking back to the environmental state 
definition, the increased importance of environmental protection in such government functions as 
revenue production can clearly be seen in this case, along with the general internalization of 
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environmental issues within society, as seen through the growth and effectiveness of the 
conservation movement.  
Civil Society as a Causal Factor  
 As we have seen, environmentalism in German society is thriving. Social movements 
against such issues as nuclear power and acid rain have led to the rise of many organizations and 
the German population as a whole has embraced environmental protection as a key issue. In 
order to understand the effects that this has had on the German environmental state, we must first 
analyze the political opportunity structure under which the movement has operated. To do this, 
the nature of state policy making and its attitude towards civil society (accommodating, 
supportive, repressive, etc.) along with resource availability of movement organizations will be 
covered. 
Starting with the state, Germany has been historically friendly towards its environmental 
movement. Looking to the previous section, it is quite clear that there have been countless 
opportunities for organizations to form and for the movement to develop national momentum. At 
the same time however, Susan Rose-Ackerman points out that the environmental policy making 
process in Germany has historically been closed to environmental groups.78 In this way, 
Germany can be considered a passive exclusive state, as it has generally left civil society alone in 
its efforts to form and organize but has typically relied on a technocratic bureaucracy to form the 
government’s agenda.79 The implications of this are quite significant in regards to the 
relationship between civil society and the environmental state in this case as strength of civil 
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society in regards to environmental issues could not be exercised directly through actions like 
lobbying, as is the case in more inclusive state structures.  
Adding to this is a relative lack of resources. While it is true that funding from the state 
helped to grow many of these environmental groups and help citizens organize at a national 
level, the actual financial and technical capacity of environmental organizations in Germany 
does not come close to that of similar groups in the United States.80 For example, it was 
previously mentioned that the Climate Allience in Germany had an annual income of about 1 
million euros. Compare this to large American NGO’s such as the Nature Conservancy and the 
Wetlands America Trust which had incomes of 972,368,622 and 17,171,656 dollars respectively 
in 2003.81 Because of this, it has been quite difficult for citizen environmental organizations in 
Germany to break into the policy creation process in Germany and truly become influential 
drivers of environmental state growth.82 
 To be clear, these points are not to discount the strength of civil society in Germany and 
its influence as a factor in this study. Instead, this context must be given so that, by 
understanding the challenges and opportunities that civil society in Germany has faced, the path 
it has taken in affecting change can be accurately described. Specifically, it is because of these 
obstacles that the environmental movement in Germany sought to gain influence by entering 
government as a political party so that they could work from the inside and put electoral pressure 
on the other parties to green their own platforms.83 The next chapter will explore this process in 
greater detail. Furthermore, it is important to note that even after the inclusion of the Green Party 
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into German government, an oppositional public sphere remained. This was due to the fact that 
the Green Party became more moderate as it sought to increase its influence in government while 
the state still remained closed to activist input.84 Again, the influence of this will be covered in 
following chapters as its relationship with ecological modernization comes into play.  
III. The Greening of Chinese Society  
An Emerging Environmental Movement in China   
Civil society in China has historically been weak, divided, and ineffective. Unlike in 
Germany, where issues such as nuclear power galvanized national support for a unified 
environmental movement, the nature of China’s population and government have confined 
environmental protest and activism from achieving such unity. It is important to understand 
however, that in recent decades civil society in China has grown considerably. This started with 
Deng Xiaoping’s opening up of Chinese society, which allowed for the widespread growth of 
organizations and associations around country. For example, there were 4,446 registered 
organizations in 1980 while in 2003 there were 266,612 registered organizations.85 The growing 
number of social organizations began to shift their attention towards environmental issues as 
activism regarding other issues had been essentially crushed by government suppression. This 
eventually resulted in the Friends of Nature, the first major Chinese environmental NGO 
(ENGO), being created and registers in 1993 and 1994 respectively. This organization has 
worked to quell various environmental issues in China such as poaching and has also placed an 
emphasis on information spreading campaigns in towns and villages; membership in the 
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organization rose to about 10,000, at which point the leaders of the organization placed a cap out 
of fear that the government would shut it down if it became too big.86  
Following the Friends of the Earth, many other ENGO’s have developed in China; by 
2015, 6,636 of the 289,000 registered social groups in China were ENGO’s.87 Prominent 
examples of this include the Centre for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims (CLAPV) which, 
after its founding in 1998, has worked to provide people, especially in rural areas, with legal 
advice. This organization maintains a 36 member staff comprised of lawyers, professionals, and 
student researchers. Another example of the rise of ENGO’s in China came in 1996 with the 
creation of the Beijing Environmental Protection Foundation. This organization differs from 
other ENGO’s in that it is defined by its close ties with the central government and considered a 
GONGO rather than a true grassroots organization. From this position, it works to provide the 
government with advice on environmental policy and also attempts to work with grassroots 
organizations in order to help with funding and other needs.88 
Beyond ENGO’s, environmental concerns have been clearly integrated into the public at 
large. For example, the 1980’s saw a rise in protests against polluting factories and power plants. 
Likewise, complaints to national authorities between 1991 and 1993 numbered 130,000, 
showcasing the general awareness of Chinese citizens to the growing environmental threats that 
they face.89 Polling data reflects this as respondents have increasingly shown a greater awareness 
of the environmental degradation that China is currently facing. For example, a study conducted 
by the Public Opinion Research Laboratory of Shanghai Jiao Tong University found that almost 
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60% of the public wanted the government to better incorporate environmental issues into 
economic development activities.90  
Studies such as these, along with the growing number of environmental related protests 
and the rise of ENGO’s shows that environmentalism and civil society at large is growing in 
China. What remains to be seen however, is how effective citizens have been in forging a real 
national framework to support a robust civil society. Simple signs of civil society growth does 
not mean that true national movements have been able to develop. In order to see whether or not 
this is the case, we will consider how successful the Chinese government has been in controlling 
the rise of civil society.  
Civil Society as a Causal Factor 
The growth of ENGO’s and GONGO’s in China has therefore been similar to Germany 
in terms of numbers and diversity. Unlike Germany however, many of the organizations and 
protests that have been seen are mostly confined to the local level.91 Due to the lack of a strong 
national movement, the growth of the environmental state in China is not reflected as well within 
civil society, despite signs of increasing environmental awareness. As with the German case, we 
must understand why civil society in China has been limited in its effectiveness in order to fully 
understand its value as a factor in environmental state growth.  
The lack of cohesion within the movement can be attributed to a variety of historical and 
political factors. For one thing, China has a well-developed legal framework intended on 
controlling and, when necessary, suppressing civil society growth. The history of these 
regulations goes back to the 1950’s, and while some of the initial laws have been repealed, there 
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remains a strong legal basis off of which NGO growth in China is carefully monitored.92 Table 
3.1 highlights the history of this framework.   
Year Regulation Status 
1950 Temporary Regulations of 
Social Organizations 
Registration 
Annulled 
1950 PRC Law of Trade Unions Annulled 
1988 Regulations for Foundations Annulled 
1989 Temporary Regulations on 
Foreign Chambers of 
Commerce 
In Effect 
1989 Regulations for Registration 
and Management of Social 
Organizations 
Annulled 
1992 PRC Law of Trade Unions In Effect 
1998 Regulations for Registration 
and Management of Social 
Organizations 
In Effect 
1998 Temporary Regulations for 
Registration and 
Management of NGNCE’s 
In Effect 
2004 Regulations on the 
Management of 
Foundations 
In Effect 
Table 3.1: China’s Laws Regarding Civil Society.93 
 While these laws pertain to a variety of social organizations, they have been especially 
consequential for NGO’s. Specifically, the dual registration requirement was a major 
development to come out of these laws. Known commonly as the “mother-in-law” policy, this 
dual registration requires that NGO’s must acquire a supervisory body, typically a government 
institution or GNGO, and that the NGO must receive permission from this body before they can 
register as an official organization with the Ministry of Civil Affairs.94 Even after their 
registration, the conduct of their operations is scrutinized as their parent organization can face 
repercussions for any overstep that the NGO may commit, which makes it difficult for NGO’s to 
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effectively organize social movements or even find supervisory organizations to sponsor them in 
the first place.95  
What does this mean for the environmental movement in China? In short, it means that it 
has not been able to develop as it has in democratic, Western nations like Germany or the United 
States.96 Like other organizations, environmental organizations in China must form political ties 
with the state in order to gain the legitimacy and resources necessary to achieve its goals.97 Of 
course there have been cases in which organizations have been able to get around the rules and 
become influential actors with relative independence, however, even in these cases the limits are 
still clear. The Friends of Nature capping their membership offers an example of this. 
Additionally, as we will see in the following chapter, the legal remedies that social organizations 
can seek have also been carefully designed by the state to check any overstep and ensure 
compliance with state objectives.  
 Because of this, the environmental movement in China has not become so powerful as to 
drive the process of environmental state formation. Granted, the previously mentioned 
advancements regarding the public’s awareness of environmental issues are noteworthy and it is 
an important development that the government has, to a certain extent, allowed the rise of 
associations in various aspects of society. When the true extent of this is considered however, we 
can see that through a strong regulatory framework the government is still largely in control of 
social movements. As such, the role of Chinese society in this case is mostly confined to 
scattered protest and occasionally violent uprisings.  
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IV. Implications 
From this discussion on both Germany and China’s civil societies, obvious differences  
and subtle parallels can be identified. Most importantly, while China has opened up in certain 
areas and allowed the growth of NGO’s and while Chinese citizens, like German citizens, have 
exhibited greater awareness of environmental issues, there is no environmental movement in 
China that is comparable to that of Germany. Even though protests and other demonstrations 
have in some cases put considerable pressure on local industries and governments, the Chinese 
government has been successful in hindering the growth of a truly influential civil society. In 
contrast, the German case shows a unified environmental movement that has been able to grow 
and build up significant influence. This has come even in the face of relatively closed off policy 
making structures.  
From this analysis, the main questions of this thesis can be identified. In Chapter 2, while 
shortcomings in China’s environmental state were acknowledged, the growth of administrative, 
regulatory, financial and knowledge based structures dedicated to environmental protection was 
significant enough to be comparable to that of Germany. With this in mind, we can expand upon 
the question driving this analysis. Specifically, the context given by this chapter leads to the 
following interrelated questions:  
1) Why have both China and Germany achieved environmental state status when one 
lacks a civil society capable of forming a unified and effective environmental 
movement?  
2) More broadly, what factors allow for environmental state development in both 
democratic and authoritarian regimes?  
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In order to answer these questions, we can first start by noting some of the parallels 
identified in this chapter. Despite the clear differences we have laid out, both states were noted as 
exclusive in their attitude towards civil society; obviously China was active in this regard while 
Germany was not however, in both cases it had similar implications. As Christian Hunold and 
John Dryzek point out, in exclusive state contexts, environmental goals are better achieved when 
tied with state economic and / or legitimation imperatives.98 Therefore, moving forward we will 
attempt to explain how in both cases political legitimacy has come into play as an explanatory 
factor in environmental state formation. In Germany, we will show that due to the political 
opportunity structure described in this chapter, the environmental movement sought to infiltrate 
the system through the formation of the Green Party and, in doing so, added environmental 
considerations to the state’s legitimacy imperative. Similarly, in China we will see that despite 
the lack of an environmental movement, the fragility of state legitimacy allowed for the inclusion 
of environmental protection and thus produced similar results as were seen in the German case.  
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Chapter 4: Political Legitimacy and the Environmental State 
I. Introduction: The Importance of Political Legitimacy in Environmental State 
Analysis 
 
What is Political Legitimacy?  
 Legitimacy is a critical aspect of any stable state, without which no government can 
maintain full authority over its territory free of social unrest. That being said, the types and 
sources of political legitimacy vary from state to state and can evolve overtime within a state. 
Political legitimacy is generally considered as the general acceptance of a state’s citizenry in the 
authority of an individual or governing body to make demands and expect compliance, borne out 
of both a fear of the use of force and a basic belief that the person/body has the fundamental right 
to make those demands.99 Previously, this belief may have been tied to family lines, with the 
right rule reserved to the descendants of those currently in power however, with the decay of 
monarchy around the world political legitimacy now encompasses a more complex and nuanced 
concept.100  Legitimacy therefore is not so simple an acquisition as to come simply from an 
arbitrary set of laws or the presence of lineage. Instead, political legitimacy today is more 
dependent than ever before on the success of the government in satisfying the expectations of 
citizens, mediating interests, and incorporating national values into the creation and enforcement 
of laws.101 In this way, the nature of legitimacy can vary from state to state depending on the 
unique characteristics of the nation in question as expectations, interest, and values change 
accordingly.  
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As such, multiple sources must be looked to in order to identify the foundations of 
legitimacy. These various roots of legitimacy, according to Max Weber, can be broken down into 
the following categories: rational-legal, traditional, and charismatic. Rational-legal is a type of 
political legitimacy which forms as the result of faith in institutions and the rule of law, while the 
traditional and charismatic types of legitimacy come about through respect for traditions and 
powerful individuals respectively.102 Governments can obtain legitimacy through a combination 
of these sources, with some being more prevalent than others. While these types of political 
legitimacy represent three basic forms, there are also other potential types such as “social 
eudaemonic” legitimacy, in which public faith is established through the government’s role as a 
provider of social and economic benefits.103 In order to establish the basis of this section, these 
forms will be looked into more closely so that their place in the Chinese and German contexts 
can be better identified.  
Rational-legal political legitimacy, as previously mentioned, is a form of legitimacy that 
is more dominant in developed Western democracies. It is based on a well-established set of 
institutions and laws that guide the social and political activities of a nation. Legitimacy then 
results as there is widespread belief in the ability of these institutions and legal processes to 
successfully uphold national values / interests and to function as people expect them to. An 
example of this can be seen, for example, in the Supreme Court of the United States as it works 
to defend the basic national values enshrined in the Constitution and to remain an independent 
body that functions above the political fray as people expect that it should; watch any State of the 
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Union address and you will see the efforts of the Justices to maintain this legitimacy as they 
show no emotion and do not applaud.  
In contrast, charismatic legitimacy rests on the ability of an individual or group of 
individuals to rally a nation behind such values as nationalism. It is in the leader that 
extraordinary personal charisma can be found and through this leader that people believe their 
own expectations, values and interests can be fulfilled. Hitler’s leadership in Nazi Germany 
highlights the power of such a form of legitimacy. Fascism specifically has historically operated 
as a cult, shirking the rules and guidance of institutions in favor of loyalty to a single leader such 
as Hitler in Germany or Mussolini in Italy.104 Traditional legitimacy is similarly separated from 
institutions and the rule of law and is instead built upon generations of history; monarchy for 
example, highlights this as people believe in the effectiveness of a ruling family simply because 
they have ruled for so long. This again is dependent on how successful that family has been in 
meeting the expectations of the public and furthering certain values and interests. Again 
however, both of these forms of legitimacy have become less and less prominent and are 
insufficient to explain legitimacy in most states today.  
As such, another perspective on legitimacy must be considered in order to account for the 
varying regimes that exist today that do not uphold the democratic, rule-of-law based systems 
found in many modern Western states. The eudaemonic form of legitimacy works well to fill this 
void as it explains regime characteristics in many authoritarian and/or developing states. As 
previously stated, this type of legitimacy is essentially sourced from the role of the government 
in meeting citizens’ expectations through performing well in improving quality of life. The 
means through which this is achieved can differ from nation to nation. For example, in Ghana 
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where crime is a prevalent issue, the government has been attempting to maintain legitimacy 
through effective crime control; essentially, elites in the state support the regime more if the 
government is successful in policing their neighborhoods and stopping criminal activity.105  
How is Political Legitimacy Relevant to the Environmental State?  
 Around the world today civil unrest can be attributed more and more to environmental 
degradation. The idea that environmental conditions such as climate change can result in 
resource shortages and eventual conflict is becoming a prominent idea in international security 
studies. The violence in Darfur for example, has been considered by many to be the first large 
scale “climate conflict”, as increased drought in the region caused by climate change created 
conflict between varying ethnic groups; as the government did not respond effectively to the 
issue, civil war (the ultimate breakdown in state authority) was able to take hold.106 While a 
stretch from the topic of this thesis, this example highlights the growing relationship between the 
environment and the political authority of states and supports the need to consider the effects of 
legitimacy maintenance on environmental state growth.  
Therefore, this understanding of the various forms of political legitimacy is important for 
our discussion on environmental state growth. As will be established, the governments of 
Germany and China gain their legitimacy from different sources. What unites them however, is 
the basic necessity of this legitimacy, regardless of the source; this was touched upon at the end 
of the previous chapter. As the management of environmental issues has become linked with 
various institutions, economic performance, and our perceptions of a good quality of life, it is a 
natural next step to consider the ways in which the environment has become linked with political 
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legitimacy. Therefore, it is the aim of this section to highlight the growing role that the 
environment has played in maintaining legitimacy for both Germany and China and the 
subsequent effects that this has had on the growth of their respective environmental states. 
II. Political Legitimacy and the Chinese Environmental State  
The Nature of Chinese Political Legitimacy 
In the case of China, the dominant form of political legitimacy must first be made clear. 
In contrast to many Western democracies, China does not rely on a rational-legal source of 
legitimacy. Instead, political legitimacy in China can be seen in other forms. For instance, the 
love that people had (and in many cases still have) for Mao could point to charismatic legitimacy 
as being prevalent in China. At the same time however, since Mao and with the onset of 
unprecedented economic growth, the social eudaemonic form of legitimacy seems to be 
dominant. This is not unique to China, as many countries with communist/authoritarian regimes 
make up for the lack of political freedoms granted to citizens through heavy investments into 
social welfare programs such as education, healthcare, job security and more; as these are 
dependent on continuously positive economic performance however, this form of legitimacy is 
quite fickle as no country can guarantee non-stop economic growth and improvement.107 
 This development of political legitimacy in China has been noted in a study on the 
Communist Party’s maintenance of power as a shift from an “original justification” to a 
“utilitarian justification”. In this view, the CCP came into power through armed struggle and 
then first achieved legitimacy through a combination of the personal appeal of Mao and the 
match between communist ideology and Chinese moral traditions.108 This view matches with 
Weber’s perceptions of charismatic and traditional legitimacy. The “utilitarian justification” 
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however, was also quite important and, as a justification of power through the role of the state in 
providing for the interests and welfare of the people, was bolstered through extensive 
investments in social welfare programs; with the death of Mao and the underwhelming charisma 
of his successors, legitimacy in China begin to shift away from the original justification and 
towards the utilitarian, as people grew to expect the government to provide improved living 
standards.109 In this, we see the rise of the dominance of the social eudaemonnic form of 
legitimacy in China, as the communist regime has been able to maintain consistent authority 
through meeting the expectations of the people in respect to economic growth and subsequent 
quality of life. The question now is whether or not China will be able to continue to meet those 
expectations in the future and what the implications are for the state if it is not able to match the 
rising standards of its citizens.  
The Environmental Link  
 In this way, the merging of the environment and legitimacy in China can be seen. The 
economic growth rates that have resulted in China’s rise as a world power are beginning to wane. 
The recent trade war with the United States can be blamed in part but in reality the slowdown 
began long before the trade war.110 As the country shifts economic gears, it will become more 
and more difficult for the government to boast the same successes as a means of retaining its 
legitimacy. To be clear, this is not to say that the economic outlook for China is negative. The 
point is that even with moderate growth rates and a bright economic future, the continued 
promise of improved living standards that social eudaemonic legitimacy demands would be less 
clearly met by economic growth alone. Other standards, especially environmental standards, will 
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become more and more embedded in the formula of China’s political legitimacy. This can be 
summed up by the voice of one Chinese citizen who noted in a study on the relationship between 
pollution and perceived quality of life that, “…the economy is good enough and there are plenty 
of opportunities to make money, but the air quality is so bad that I don’t even want to go 
out….I’d rather have a healthier living environment than own a mountain of gold.”111 
 These underlying issues of environmental degradation are compounded by intense 
urbanization. In China, the main economic divisions can be seen between rural and urban 
communities. The growing Chinese cities are the hubs of economic development. Urban 
populations in China are estimated to grow by over 300 million by 2030, which makes the future 
of environmental progress look bleak; the increase in urbanization levels to 41% in 2005 brought 
with it a host of environmental issues, as air, water and soil pollution worsened and produced 7 
of the world’s 10 most polluted cities.112 This is especially troubling in relation to legitimacy, as 
cities have historically been hotbeds for social unrest when public expectations are not met.113 As 
urbanization, affluence and expectations rise, and as the environment continues to worsen under 
such strains, the ability of China’s current regime to meet expectations will become related to the 
environment in the same way that it currently is with economic growth.  
Environmental protection is therefore tied to legitimacy through its growing importance  
in public perceptions on quality of life. As conditions worsen, so too do issues of social unrest 
and violent protest. For instance, the year 2005 alone saw over 50,000 documented protests 
related to environmental issues in China.114 In fact, the number of environmental incidents has 
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increased by 29% each year since 1996.115 Such outburst of social unrest indicate a breakdown in 
legitimacy, as it highlights the failure of the government to meet citizens’ expectations in 
fulfilling their interests (improving standards of living). In a study published in 2013, Chinese 
citizens in urban areas were surveyed on their satisfaction with public management of eight 
different areas (public education, public healthcare, public housing, public safety, infrastructure, 
public cultural/recreational facilities, public transportation, and environmental protection) and 
they were asked to rank their satisfaction on a scale of 1-10, 10 being the best; environmental 
protection ranked last out of the eight areas, with a score of approximately 6 out of 10.116 
Environmental protection is then clearly an area in which the current regime can and must 
improve conditions and bolster their authority through growth in public satisfaction. 
Finally, the role of environmental protection in maintaining economic growth must be 
noted. While conventional wisdom focuses on the opposing interests of the environmental and 
economic realms, it is becoming more and more evident today that issues such as climate change 
and air pollution carry with them their own economic costs and that continued productivity is 
dependent on solutions to these problems. The World Bank highlighted this relationship in 2007, 
when it estimated that 5.8% of GDP could be considered lost when the costs of negative 
environmental externalities such as pollution are taken into account.117 Furthermore, water 
pollution has severely limited China’s fresh water supply, straining demand not only for drinking 
but also for agricultural use, as 28% of China’s rivers were considered in 2014 too toxic even for 
irrigation purposes.118 The environmental issues that the state currently faces are therefore 
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hindering its future economic potential and weakening the base upon which the government has 
built its authority.  
In these ways, the authority of the Communist Party in China has become dependent on 
the environment. On one level, they must address growing issues such as air pollution to create 
an environment that allows for continued economic growth, which provides the current basis of 
their authority. On another level, they must address environmental issues as another means of 
improving quality of life, as the rapid economic growth rates inevitably slow and environmental 
conditions increase in importance to the public. Through these considerations, it is becoming 
more and more clear to the Chinese government that environmental issues must be tackled for 
the future of their authority in China.   
Effects on the Environmental State 
 The merging of environmental issues with questions of state legitimacy is therefore, quite 
obvious in China today. Our discussion on this trend so far has established the link between 
environmental degradation and social unrest in a state that relies on a form of political stability 
that has proven to be prone to collapse. With this link understood, the question is now centered 
on the outcomes. How has the relationship between the environment and political legitimacy in 
China helped to build the Chinese environmental state? The answer can be found in the structural 
changes that have been made to ease public tensions and to improve quality of life in regards to 
the environment.   
 An example of this can be seen in the NMCEP program mentioned in the literature 
review. While aspects of this program’s implementation aided in building our environmental 
state definition, it is helpful now to return to the topic as it highlights the influence that 
legitimacy maintenance has had in the specific case of China. Interviews with government 
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officials related to the program noted in interviews that a major influence in its implementation 
was the fact that it would aid in socio-economic development.119 As such, the program was in 
part useful in, “…mobilizing public support for the work of the EPB and enhancing its 
legitimacy and authority.”120 This pressure to maintain legitimacy then resulted in increased 
financial commitments made by local governments to build their environmental protection 
capacities (the program mandated that cities spend a certain proportion of their GDP per year on 
environmental programs in order to achieve the NMCEP standard).121 By 2009, 67 cities 
throughout the country had achieved this status, marking, at least to some extent, a growth in the 
environmental state at the local levels.122 Eventually, the success of this program led to a more 
the creation of a more ambitious city development plan with stricter requirements, known as the 
National Ecological City program.123 This seems to correspond with the development of the 
ecological civilization concept that will be covered in Chapter 6.  
This process has been furthered by the cadre evaluation initiative which was widely 
regarded as an effort to quell social unrest through improved environmental management at the 
local levels. As explained in Chapter 2, the reflection of environmental initiative implementation 
throughout the various levels of government is an indicator of environmental state status. In this 
respect, China has historically lagged as it has had issues with local officials and policy 
enforcement. Due to the increasing importance of these issues in maintaining state legitimacy 
however, the state undertook stricter evaluation of party cadres to ensure that they were 
complying with targets set by the state. Heavy metal pollution offers an example of this, as toxic 
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levels of these substances were found in the blood of many local children; this resulted in a 
revolt by local citizens, during which police cars were flipped and the industrial facility was 
broken into and vandalized. The government then set hard targets at heavy metal pollution 
reduction of 15% from 2007 levels by 2015 and included provisions to ensure the accountability 
of local officials, such as the inclusion of pollution reduction results by local governments in 
their socio-economic development evaluations.124 
 Actions taken to prevent social unrest can also be seen through the expansion of 
bureaucracy in the establishment of environmental courts. The role of these courts has been 
essentially to provide a public outlet of anger against local polluters and to also serve an 
educational function on environmental issues as judges of these courts often speak at local 
schools. It has been noted that the number of cases these courts actually here, in relation to the 
numbers of environmental incidents is quite low (the environmental court in Kunming province 
only heard 106 cases between its establishment in 2008 and 2012) and the cases that are heard 
are often symbolic, exemplified by the 2010 lawsuit the court in Kunming filed against two pig 
farms, simply to warn other polluters. In this way, the purpose of the courts has mainly been to 
act as a symbol of environmental action to help ease public dissatisfaction and to go after 
polluters that the government wishes to go after.125  
 Lastly, air pollution has presented itself as one of the greatest threats to political stability 
in China. The US embassy’s installation of a PM2.5 monitor at its headquarters in Beijing to 
tweet hourly readings highlights this fear, as the reaction of the Chinese government was to 
criticize the mistrust that this created for China’s own environmental organizations.126 In 
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response to such threats of air pollution, China has committed to cut the percentage of its total 
energy produced by coal from 66% to 62% by 2020, with the share of renewables rising from 
11% to 15%.127 The state has even turned to some unconventional means, such a 30 million 
dollar investment in the summer of 2016 to curb air pollution through “cloud seeding” 
techniques that are intended to increase rainfall and clear the air of heavy pollutants.128  
 Social stability in China has therefore directly influenced government action on 
environmental issues. While it can be argued that this action is somewhat shallow, as seen by the 
environmental courts, it shows the growing importance of the environment in the CCP’s 
maintenance of authority. This then helped to expand the environmental state through a growing 
bureaucracy, greater commitments to enforcement of policies and targets at the local levels, and 
the commitments of national plans and funding towards curbing air pollution. In these ways, 
there is a direct link between political legitimacy and the environmental state in China.   
III. Political Legitimacy and the German Environmental State 
The Nature of German Political Legitimacy  
 Unlike the case of China, political legitimacy in Germany can be significantly tied to 
entrenched democratic institutions. While economic success and public welfare still play an 
important role, the public faith in the democratic processes and laws that guide the state are the 
underlying sources of state legitimacy. Such setbacks as economic slowdowns are therefore not 
as likely to produce questions of authority or social unrest. Instead, it is through the democratic 
institutions that define the state that the interests, values and expectations of the people are 
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expressed. Specifically, the German parliament represents the ultimate outlet for these 
ingredients of political legitimacy.  
 Parliament in Germany today consists of two bodies known as the Bundestag and 
Bundesrat. The Bundestag consists currently of 709 seats, filled through public elections every 
four years. This is the primary legislative body in Germany and also works to elect the 
Chancellor of the state. The Bundesrat in contrast is more of a secondary body composed of 69 
members that are appointed by Germany’s 16 states and is therefore responsible for ensuring that 
state interests are protected in any federal legislation that involves concurrent state/federal 
issues.129 While the Bundesrat is of course an important factor in German governance and the 
creation of policy, the Bundestag will be the focus of this section for a couple reasons, the first 
being the public elections. As public elections dictate the party composition of the body’s seats, 
it is a better reflection of national values / interests and would therefore offer more of a glimpse 
into how citizens expect their institutions to function. The second reason, stemming from the 
first, is that it is in the Bundestag where coalition building can bring together diverse positions to 
form a governing majority. Through these aspects of the Bundestag, the role of the body in 
establishing public trust in the institutions of German government can be seen.  
 For example, in the Bundestag today there are six parties that make up the body, those 
being the CDU/CSU, SPD, AfD, FDP, Die Linke, and Alliance 90/the Greens. The variety of 
parties present highlights the varying political beliefs that they represent. In contrast with, for 
instance, the United States Congress where two major parties each represent broad coalitions of 
voters, small parties can form and represent more specified interests in Germany, where only 5% 
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of the national vote in an election is required to obtain seats in parliament.130 Coalition building 
then happens between parties rather than within and it is in this process that political perspectives 
are brought together to form an effective governing majority; even with the parties left out of the 
governing coalition, their own views still hold influence through their presence in the body.  
This was seen for example through the influence that AfD had on Germany’s policies 
regarding refugees. The AfD, as Germany’s far-right party, took advantage of the rising tensions 
in Germany and Europe in general over the influx of Middle Eastern refugees. After forming in 
2013, the AfD built upon the fear and discontent that this mix of intense immigration (over 1 
million refugees from countries such as Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan came to Europe in 2015 
alone) and economic discontent has produced.131 This led to surprising electoral success in 2017 
and they are now represented in Parliament with 91 seats, making them the third largest party 
and the main opposition to the CDU/CSU and SPD coalition.132 This rising pressure led to 
Angela Merkel, as the head of the CDU, reversing her own course of a German 
“Wilkommkultur” and agreeing to a deal sending a large number of refugees back.133 In this 
way, opposition parties are still able to effectively represent the values of their supporters within 
the system.  
While the purpose of this section has not been to provide a comprehensive analysis of 
political legitimacy in Germany, the characteristics of the German government mentioned are 
important as they introduce the basic concepts relevant for this study. It has been important 
simply to establish the dominance of institutions and legal processes in state legitimacy as 
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explained through Weber’s rational-legal perspective. The German Parliament, as a primary 
symbol of the state’s democratic institutions, maintains this legitimacy through diverse party 
representation made possible through the 5% threshold and coalition building. These are the key 
points that will then become important in showing exactly how environmental issues worked 
their way into the equation of political legitimacy in Germany and the effects that this had on the 
environmental state.  
The Environmental Link  
 From this discussion on political legitimacy in Germany, the role of political parties and 
the Bundestag in maintaining public trust in the government is evident through their ability to 
effectively represent various public interests and values. In this way, the Green party in Germany 
has acted as the major link between public environmental interests and government action. As 
such, through a consideration of the party’s origins in Germany and its subsequent effects on the 
government, the growing importance of the environment in German political legitimacy.  
 The history of the Green party in Germany goes back to the late 1970’s when key issues 
such as nuclear power were igniting heated debate and a growing environmentalist movement. 
At this time, the environmental movement in Germany was largely confrontational towards 
existing establishments and the political institutions in the West German state. This type of 
resentment towards the state was a common theme during the 70’s as the environmental 
movement was matched by a growing student movement sparked by the increase in size of 
German universities and student enrollment. For example, among postindustrial citizens (citizens 
with a higher level of education and affluence) in West Germany, dissatisfaction with the 
democratic regime increased from 8% in 1972 to over 23% in 1976.134 Another survey 
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conducted in the midst of the anti-nuclear protests showed that in the election districts of 
Freiburg and Emmendingen in 1975, 72% and 63% respectively of citizens believed the existing 
parties did not represent their interests.135 It was therefore quite clear that many in Germany at 
that time did not feel that the government was representing national values as expected. 
In 1980 however, various factions of the movement came together to form the Green 
Party. Within three years, the party was able to rally enough support to surpass the five percent 
threshold; in 1983, with 5.6% of the national vote, the Green Party entered Parliament. It was in 
this new party that many in the environmental movement such as the students, found better 
representation. For instance, before the birth of the Green Party many West German citizens 
noted little difference between the environmental proposals of the two leading parties at that 
time.136 The Green Party has thus established an institutionalization of environmental concerns 
within the German government in its offer of alternative and distinct representation of national 
environmental values. The intrusion of environmental concerns into the political legitimacy of 
Germany manifested itself in the creation of the SPD-Green coalition in 1998; even outside of 
this coalition the Green Party has achieved consistent success and influence in the Bundestag, as 
seen in 2009 when it polled at 10.7% nationally, the best results in the history of the party.137 
The intrusion of the Green Party into German politics can therefore, be considered a 
primary example of the merging of environmental concerns with the legitimacy imperative of the 
state. This has been seen through the rise of the party from growing social distrust in the 
democratic institutions and procedures. As people came to believe that the existing institutions 
were not representing them (as seen in the widespread social unrest and protest at the time) the 
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Green Party was created to fill this void. Through the growth in support of the party, its eventual 
success as a coalition partner in 1998, and its continued influence as a member of Parliament, the 
story of the Green Party highlights the inclusion of the environment in factors relevant for the 
maintenance of authority and public support for Germany’s democracy. 2006 polling 
underscores this trend, as 94% of the public in the western part of Germany and 93% of the 
public in the eastern part, say that protection of the environment is “definitely or probably 
government responsibility”; in comparison, “help industry” polled at 58% and 62% for West and 
East respectively.138  
Effects on the Environmental State 
 As the relationship between the environment and political legitimacy in Germany has 
been established, the actions that the government has taken in response to the growth of this 
relationship must be considered in order to understand the effect that this has had on Germany’s 
environmental state growth. This can be seen again following the path of the Green Party in the 
Bundestag. From their initial arrival in the body to their eventual coalition and beyond, the 
relationship between the legitimation imperative of the state and environmental concerns that this 
party represents has had significant impacts on building up the environmental state structures 
outlined by Duit’s framework.  
 This can first be seen in the role of the Green Party’s rise in increasing the importance of 
the environmental agenda in German government. Responding to the increasing size of the 
Greens and the rising distrust of the system of that it represented, the other major parties in the 
Bundestag began to adopt more aggressive environmental initiatives. This was seen, for instance, 
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through the actions taken under the conservative leadership of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. In an 
expansion of administrative capacity, the BMU was created during this period in 1986 partly in 
response to the unrest resulting from the issue of nuclear power (worsened by the Chernobyl 
incident) and the subsequent rise of the Green Party as opposition.139 Regulatory capacity was 
also increased in part as a response to Green Party pressure, as can be seen in the amendments to 
the Federal Clean Air Act in 1985 and 1990 which strengthened the definition of Best Available 
Technology to further reduce air pollution and help ease the crisis of Waldsterben (forest death) 
that the Green Party pushed as a critical issue.140 From these examples, the role of the Green 
Party in raising the importance of environmental issues within other parties in the Bundestag and 
subsequently the government at large is clear.  
 Furthermore, the Green Party’s ascension into a governing coalition with the SPD 
allowed it follow through on some of its main priorities such as the development of the Eco-tax 
and the phase out of nuclear energy. Passed in 1999, the Law Introducing the Environmental 
Fiscal Reform worked to reduce energy consumption and resultant emissions through increased 
taxes on various energy products such as fuel oils, gasoline, diesel, electricity and natural gas; 
these taxes came with expected decreases in carbon dioxide production of 20-25 million tons per 
year and revenue generation meant to reduce the burden of employers and employees in pension 
insurance contributions by up to 1.9% by 2003.141 Through this, the inclusion of environmental 
concerns into primary state functions such as revenue production for social programs can be seen 
to have resulted from the Green Party’s success. Revenues from this tax also went towards 
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investment into renewable technologies as the Green Party worked to phase the state off of 
nuclear power, a key issue in the social unrest that sparked the need for the party; the party 
established the goal of closing all nuclear facilities by 2020, a goal that initially seemed 
unfeasible but gained the support of Angela Merkel in 2011 after the Fukushima meltdown in 
Japan.142 
 While the influence of the rise of environmental issues in German political legitimacy 
was in these ways helpful in initiating in these changes, there have been limits to the extent to 
which this accounts for Germany’s advancements. For example, this was seen during the period 
of reunification in the 1990’s. While the growth of post-industrial values in the West led to 
questions regarding the effectiveness of existing institutions in meeting public expectations, the 
economic collapse of the East hindered the occurrence of any similar phenomena in this part of 
the newly unified nation. In this way, political legitimacy in Germany reverted in some ways 
back to meet the more basic expectations of its citizens in the East such as job production and 
economic growth.143 Additionally, while it was clearly augmented by the growing relationship 
between the environment and state legitimacy, Germany’s active stance towards environmental 
issues began before the heavy social unrest discussed earlier began to take hold. The 1950’s for 
instance, saw an increased response at the federal level to issues of water and air pollution, 
culminating the passage of the Water Household Act of 1957 and the Clean Air Maintenance 
Law of 1959.144 
IV. Conclusion 
From the establishment of the relationship between political legitimacy and the  
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environmental states in Germany and China, the explanatory value of this theory can be 
identified. In China, a direct link between shifting societal expectations, social unrest and the 
increasing urgency of environmental management can be found. This urgency motivated and 
produced some of the first steps towards increasing state capacity through administrative, 
regulatory and financial commitments. These results came even in the face of an authoritarian 
state and the absence of a unified civil society. This is due mostly to the fact that legitimacy in 
China (and in most authoritarian states) is more fragile than in states more deeply engrained 
institutions and legal structures and the motivation to maintain it and even build upon it by 
improving living conditions was quite strong.  
In Germany, we showed a similar link yet less direct link. In this case, an active civil 
society and its unified environmental movement were able to attach environmental concerns to 
the state legitimacy imperative by forming a political party. In doing so, it overcame the 
obstacles of Germany’s passively exclusive state noted in the previous chapter and was able to 
work from the inside to help implement policy initiatives that worked towards building the 
environmental state. This link is less direct than it is in the Chinese case however, as the well-
established democratic institutions of the state in Germany do not lose legitimacy as easily. This 
is partly why civil society had to take the political route to affect change as simply engaging in 
protest and social unrest was not enough on its own to merge political legitimacy with 
environmental protection. Once these two concepts were effectively merged, the imperative was 
still not quite as strong as it was in China where the threat of a true crisis remained.  
In this way, while there is certainly a relationship now between the environment and 
political legitimacy in Germany and as the same relationship can be found in China, the weaker 
explanatory value of this relationship in the German case leaves us with an incomplete argument. 
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As such, other explanations will help to strengthen the analysis of environmental state creation in 
both states. While political legitimacy offers the first common link, the following sections on 
international forces and ecological modernization will provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of each state and environmental state formation processes as a whole.  
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Chapter 5: The Role of International Influences in Promoting Environmental State 
Development 
I. Introduction: the Environmental State in an International Context 
The Relevance of International Linkages 
 It is quite clear today that no country acts independently of global events. As 
globalization processes increase the level and importance of international trade and cooperation, 
decisions made on one side of the world can impact global markets and politics in such ways as 
to sway the domestic decisions of states on the other. The growth of international institutions and 
supranational organizations can likewise have a marked impact on the domestic policies and, 
subsequently, the domestic character of states. This is especially true for environmental issues. 
Therefore, as the role of the state has grown to include a number of international commitments, 
and as states now rise and fall within an increasingly powerful global framework, so too must the 
environmental state be viewed in this globalized context. Despite their many differences, both 
Germany and China are powerful and active members in international trade and institutions. 
Through this underlying similarity, the specific effects that these international linkages have had 
on each nation’s environmental state growth will be made clear.  
Going back to the discussion on comparative environmental politics in the introduction of 
this thesis, multilevel linkages are a key component of comparative analyses within this field of 
study. As Meadowcroft points out and Robyn Eckersley expands upon, this outward perspective 
of the state is important in analyzing the development of environmental states as they are, 
“…increasingly an international creation in response to transboundary ecological problems, 
manifest in a growing raft of international environmental treaties...”145 Therefore, the advent of 
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Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEA’s) and environmental conferences can be looked 
to in order to consider the effects of international influences on environmental state formation. It 
is important in this case however, to look beyond environmental action plans and MEA’s; many 
states have signed on to such agreements and have not achieved environmental state 
development. The inclusion of environmental imperatives into other international institutions and 
organizations will therefore be considered. On top of this, we will consider underlying issues 
with national security that Germany and China both share. As these relate to energy 
consumption, they are inherently tied to environmental issues.  
As such, many international dynamics will be taken into account in this chapter in order 
to better understand the process of environmental state creation in each nation. It is the 
contention of this section that in an ever globalizing world with stronger international 
institutions, organizations and dependencies, a wide range of international pressures can act as 
catalysts in environmental state development and, in the cases of Germany and China, have 
already done so.   
II. The German Case in an International Perspective  
Germany’s Position at the International Level  
 Since the end of the Second World War, the story of Germany has been one inherently 
shaped by the outside world. From occupation to reunification, recent German history has been 
marked by a period of “normalization” in which it has attempted to reintegrate itself into the 
global community through reestablishing regular political and economic ties. During this same 
period, we have seen Germany become a member and leader of the European Union along with 
an international beacon of stability and democracy. 
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A critical part of this story is tied to the environmental state. While we have explored the 
link between the environmental movement, the legitimacy imperative and environmental state 
development, this explanation alone does not offer a full understanding of the dynamics at play. 
For one thing, it is important to note that the beginnings of the environmental state in Germany 
can be seen before the widespread growth of the environmental movement took hold. For 
example, the basis of modern German environmental policy began in the 1960’s and 1970’s 
under the SPD-FDP coalition and these fundamental advancements were made without any real 
pressure from society.146 Looking outwards, we will attempt to fill some of these gaps by 
considering Germany’s position at the international level since the 60’s and the influence that 
this has had in the state’s domestic characteristics.  
As the growth of the global environmental regime has become quite evident, so too has 
Germany’s role as both a participant and lead state in this process. This regime, while marked by 
the increasing number of MEA’s mentioned in the previous section, is largely the result of a 
broader process through which a set of norms, assumptions and organizations associated with the 
human-environment relationship are integrated.147 Evidence of this process can be found in the 
correlation between the increasing scope of environmental treaties and the number of national 
environmental ministries in states around the world.148 As such, Germany’s position in this 
regime and its domestic consequences are worthy of consideration.  
On top of this, Germany’s further integration into the increasingly globalized economy 
and its obligations to uphold a variety of EU standards along with its own are important to 
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consider in any analysis of the German state, including its growing environmental 
responsibilities. Specifically, Germany dependence on foreign energy sources along with the role 
of the global environmental regime in steering German policy will be highlighted in the 
following sections. From this, the relationship between international influences and the German 
government’s attempt to build the environment state will be seen.  
Access to Energy Resources  
 Despite its reputation as a manufacturing powerhouse, Germany is not blessed with a 
wide array of natural resources. While coal is relatively abundant, the rise of the Green Party and 
its representation of the public response to acid rain described in Chapters 2 & 3 have made 
further use of this resource problematic. Likewise, other domestic energy sources such as nuclear 
power have not been able to meet Germany’s energy demands as it too has had a controversial 
past and has been scheduled to be phased out by 2022.149 As a result, oil and natural gas have 
largely acted as the base of German energy usage and, from a dearth of domestic sources, the 
state has maintained a significant reliance on foreign imports of these resources. This reliance 
goes back to the 1950’s when West Germany sourced much of its oil from the Middle East and 
can still be seen to this day in its dependence on Russia.150 In 2015 for example, Russia provided 
40% of Germany’s total natural gas imports.151 As with natural gas, in 2016 Russia supplied 
almost 40% of Germany’s 91 million tonnes of imported oil.152 Table 5.1 gives more detail on 
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Germany’s energy sources and shows the persistence of its overall dependence on imports in 
recent decades.  
 Domestic Production of Resource  
(% of total usage) 
Imports of Resource  
(% of total usage) 
Resource 2006 2016 2006 2016 
Mineral Oil  3% 2% 97% 98% 
Natural Gas 18% 8% 82% 92% 
Hard Coal 33% 7% 67% 93% 
Lignite 100% 100% 0% 0% 
Nuclear Fuels 100% 100% 0% 0% 
Table 5.1: German Energy Imports v. Domestic Production.153 
 With such a high dependence on foreign imports, Germany has been subject to a 
tumultuous history of energy security. This was first seen in the 1970’s, with the oil shocks that 
occurred that decade. While the first of these (caused by the OPEC embargo) was less significant 
for Germany in particular as it was mostly aimed at American markets, it acted as a wakeup call 
for Germany and Europe at large; the growing relationship between energy and national security 
was placed on the national agenda.154 Later, in 2006 and 2007, conflicts with the Ukraine and 
Belarus prompted Russia to shut down major gas pipelines, putting Germany and much of 
Europe in danger of energy shortages.155 Events such as these further validated German policy 
makers’ growing belief that their dependence on foreign oil and natural gas made the country 
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incredibly vulnerable to any number of geopolitical events. This is significant as it marked a new 
paradigm in German energy policy under which energy was seen as an issue of national security, 
which differed from the previously dominant presumption that energy was solely an economic 
issue that should be left largely to market actors.156  
 From this shift in German energy policy, the effects of international influences on the 
environmental state can begin to be seen. In this case, these effects are evident through increased 
funding for green technology R&D and a strengthened drive to improve industrial efficiency. 
Going back to the oil shocks of the 1970’s, Germany followed the United States in pursuing 
taxation and federal spending as their main response to this growing threat.157 In order to 
diversify and strengthen their own domestic energy production, Germany increased their public 
R&D spending on energy in the years following the oil shocks; in 1976 nonnuclear government 
energy R&D spending amounted to 116.7 million dollars, while in 1978 and 1980 this number 
increased to 239.1 million and 261.1 million dollars respectively.158 
Despite decades of pursuing this strategy however, the Russian pipeline shutdowns 
showed that previous efforts had not been sufficient, and added a new sense of urgency to 
improve efforts at building Germany’s green energy capacity.159 These efforts constituted one of 
the three fundamental principles upon which Germany’s new Energie-Außenpolitik (energy 
foreign policy), which was outlined by three working groups established in 2006 at the start of a 
series of national energy summits; climate change was also included as a key aspect of this 
energy / national security hybrid policy approach.160 In order to implement this new approach to 
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energy policy in a more aggressive way than previous efforts, the Energiewende (energy 
transformation) was established in 2011 as Germany’s updated plan build up its domestic 
capacity to produce green energy sources and move away from coal, oil and nuclear power.161 
While this plan was in part a response to the phase out of nuclear energy which began under the 
Green coalition, a major motivating factor was also the increased energy security that 
investments in domestic green energy would bring, as was noted by former Minister for 
Economics and Energy Sigmar Gabriel.162 In order to effectively oversee and implement the 
Energiewende, significant bureaucratic and financial structures had to be put into place. For 
example, the BMWi added the Directorate-General III which included divisions responsible for 
incorporating the goals of the energy transformation into Germany’s energy structure.163 
The German government’s goal of energy independence has therefore had a significant 
impact on Germany’s environmental initiatives. International instability, by highlighting the 
importance of domestic energy production, has pushed Germany to invest heavily in a state led 
energy transition. This transition requires an extensive administrative, regulatory and financial 
framework. As such, the influence of international forces can be seen to have helped push 
environmental state growth in Germany.  
Global Environmental Regime   
 Because of Germany’s recent attempts to normalize its role in the global community and 
reshape its national image, Germany has been motivated to take significant measures to ensure 
its own participation and compliance with the international environmental regime.164 On top of 
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this drive to reemerge as a global leader, the oil shocks mentioned in the previous section along 
with the move away from nuclear power and coal explained in the previous chapter led to an 
increased motivation to learn from and work with other countries to solve domestic 
environmental issues.165 As a result, Germany’s environmental policy measures have been 
significantly shaped and steered by this regime. For this reason, it is critical to look into the ways 
in which the growth of the environmental regime has driven the formation of the German 
environmental state, through multilateral environmental agreements, international conferences, 
and the inclusion of environmental considerations into international financial and political 
institutions.  
 These influences can be seen in the beginning of Germany’s environmental state growth. 
In its attempts to integrate itself into the environmental regime, Germany looked to the United 
States as a model. In fact, many of the initial advances in German environmental policy resulted 
from the progress that German policy makers at the time saw in US environmental state 
development. The CDU-CSU coalition government during the 60’s in Germany, even before the 
Green Party rose to power, began taking the initiative on pollution control, and looked to 
American environmental policy to craft its first major legislation, the National Environmental 
Policy Act, in 1969.166 Continuing this trend of following international (especially American) 
pressures, the German government followed along with the United States in the 70’s when the 
American government began to push international action on the issue of chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFC’s) and ozone depletion.167 Following steps to reduce its CFC use, Germany set itself up for 
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the eventual adoption of the Montreal Protocol, which came about in 1987 and was approved by 
the German government in 1988.168 This then had a significant impact on increasing Germany’s 
regulatory framework as it culminated in the ban of CFC use through the CFC/halon Prohibition 
Ordinance of 1991.169  
 This example highlights the influence of the environmental regime in greening 
Germany’s industry and supporting sustainable development. Adding to this is EU policy, as it 
too has further worked to shape German initiatives in respect to green industry. For example, 
shifts in EU policy helped to spur a growth in the wind turbine industry in Germany. Seeking a 
more liberal energy market, the EU established its renewable energy promotion directive, which 
influenced Germany to update its own energy policies by amending the Energy Industry Act 
(EnWG) in 1998.170 This amendment had a significant impact on Germany’s investment into 
such technologies as it started a new era of wind power generation in Germany, as seen through 
increased employment in the sector (15,600 people in 1998 vs. 53,200 in 2002) and heightened 
government funding established through the feed-in tariff system that was established to help 
support the growing industry.171  
 Later, international influences were seen to have pushed German environmental policy 
beyond the industrial level. For instance, the UN Conference on Environment and Development, 
held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, was a noteworthy step forward in Germany’s path towards 
environmental state status. This conference resulted in several important developments, 
including the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Initially, Germany was opposed to the 
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CBD, which required the establishment of national strategies on the protection of biodiversity.172 
Despite this initial hesitation however, Germany, along with other states such as Japan, 
eventually supported the CBD in order to uphold their national images as leaders and active 
participants in the environmental regime.173 Since signing onto the CBD, Germany has made 
significant investments at home and abroad in order to follow through with its commitments to 
this convention. For example, domestically Germany has set targets in its National Strategy on 
Biodiversity (NBS) to reserve 2% of its land as extensive wilderness areas and 5% as woodlands 
protected from use and development.174 Recently, this has resulted in the establishment of new 
national parks such as the Black Forest in 2014 and Hunsrück-Hochwald in 2015; funding to 
support such initiatives has been directed from a variety of sources including R&D programs and 
flood protection programs.175 Additionally, in accordance with the CBD, Germany has sent 
considerable funds abroad to help promote similar initiatives (approximately 500 million euros 
per year since 2013).176 
 While we mentioned the role that some activists played in pushing the establishment of 
protected areas, the further expansion of such areas has been greatly stimulated by international 
influences. For example, even though the government has taken an interest in pursuing such an 
expansion however, large portions of the public have in the past pushed back against such 
efforts. Many efforts to establish natural protected areas have mostly been supported by 
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administrative officials at the federal level, while private actors such as the Federal Association 
of Persons Concerned by National Parks (Bundesverband der Nationalparkbetroffenen) have in 
many cases organized against these advancements.177 Such opposition was seen through public 
demonstrations in areas such as Uckermärkische Seen nature park, which led to the burning of 
park equipment and the blatant disregard of protective regulations enforced in the area.178  
 After considering these advancements, the role of the international environmental regime 
in steering German environmental policy developments is quite clear. From the origins of 
Germany’s first environmental initiatives, to its current initiatives regarding land management 
and sustainable development, international influences have clearly been a driving force behind 
Germany’s environmental progress. By driving such developments, international agenda setting, 
MEA’s and institutions have all aided in initiating a process through which Germany’s 
government has strengthened its environmental state apparatus.  
III. The Chinese Case in an International Perspective  
China’s Position at the International Level 
 It is hard to overlook the fact that China has especially felt the impact of international 
forces on its environmental state development. Ever since Deng Xiaoping’s efforts to open up 
the country began decades ago, the economic and social landscapes of this nation have been 
significantly shaped by the outside world. Rising as an economic, social and political power, 
China has had to maneuver a complex set of international institutions and norms. As such, 
analyzing any form of its development would not be complete without a consideration of the 
impact that the international landscape has had on its domestic character.  
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 Building off of the influence of political legitimacy maintenance, the impact that energy 
security has had on motivating the Chinese government to increase its investments in green 
industry will be considered as it was in the German case. Additionally, international conferences 
and conventions have directly influenced the growth of environmental policy in China, as noted 
by top government officials such as Wang Yuqing.179 Because of this, they too will provide 
useful insight into the process of environmental state formation in China.  
Access to Energy Resources  
 As with Germany, we must consider the history of China’s energy needs along with its 
access to resources in order to more fully understand the effects that the international landscape 
has had on the environmental state. As China has undergone rapid industrialization and 
urbanization, its energy demands have skyrocketed and will continue to do so well into the 
foreseeable future. This has resulted in a 9.98% growth rate in energy demand between 2002 and 
2010, one of the highest energy demand growth rates in the world.180 While this represents 
tremendous economic success, it also presents a major problem. Domestically, China has access 
to a variety of natural resources such as coal and oil, however, these have become insufficient to 
meet the needs of the economy and society today. In 2012, oil and coal accounted for 66% and 
20% respectively of China’s energy usage.181 With coal however, the government had decided 
by 2015 that it would cap coal’s share of total energy consumption at 63% by 2020 in order to 
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help tackle the thick smog that was chocking urban areas (relating back to the previous chapter 
on legitimacy).182  
Because of this, China has attempted to expand its domestic oil production but this too 
has proven difficult. Going back to the 1950’s, successful exploration of oil fields allowed China 
to enjoy decades of energy independence, a trend lasted until 1993 when China became a net 
importer of oil.183 While the state has continued its efforts to grow domestic oil production, it has 
encountered many roadblocks as many of its major onshore oilfields are located either in densely 
populated eastern regions or geographically inaccessible western regions and new offshore 
drilling operations are restricted by territorial disputes in the South China Sea and East China 
Sea, as seen in the following map.184 
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Map 5.1: China’s Domestic Oil Resources.185 
Due to this incredible increase in energy demands and insufficient domestic resources, 
China began in the early 2000’s to look towards investment in foreign oil sources; in these 
efforts, the character of the international landscape significantly shaped China’s choices and the 
eventual outcomes. For example, the initial investments in foreign oil that China intended to 
make were confined to a limited number of countries, as Western companies already prominent 
in many of the top oil producing states made access to resources too competitive. This then 
resulted in a focus on countries which had been subjected to Western sanctions in which Western 
companies were unable to operate, namely Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Russia and Venezuela. The 
effectiveness of these efforts however, have been quite questionable as US led sanctions against 
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Russia have resulted in substantial losses for Russian oil companies that China has invested in. 
This uncertainty is made worse by the spread of political instability in many of the other 
countries China relies on for oil exports. For instance, the investments China has made in foreign 
oil sources have been limited in their returns due to such incidents as the bombing of oil facilities 
by Arab separatist groups in Iran, civil wars in Sudan, and attacks on Chinese employees in 
many other African countries. On top of this is the looming threat of dwindling oil supplies in 
relatively stable areas where China has invested such as the Kurdish region in Iraq.186 
 From these troubles, the energy policies pursued by the Chinese can be seen to have been 
highly dependent on a variety of international pressures, including political instability, violence, 
and sanctions. In order to reduce the vulnerability of China’s energy demands to such forces, 
China has been seeking other means through which it can increase its energy independence. 
Solar power for instance, has been a focus of China’s new energy policies as it offers a shield 
from international uncertainty. It is estimated that between 2008 and 2018 China has invested up 
to 47 billion dollars in solar panel manufacturers through a variety of tax credits and loans; the 
success of such efforts is manifested in the 125 gigawatts of installed solar power (as compared 
with 40 in Germany) and the 51 gigawatt / year manufacturing capacity of Chinese photovoltaic 
cell producers.187 Additionally, the International Energy Agency for example, has noted that 
China is on track to invest over 6 trillion dollars in green energy technologies by 2040 and 
currently creates around 24% of its energy from renewable sources, 9% more than that of the 
United States; this success is bolstered by other similar investments such as massive subsidies for 
electric vehicles (ten times more than the US).188 In this way, China has improved its standing as 
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an environmental state through large commitments of funds towards technologies that work to 
advance environmental protection efforts. These commitments were catalyzed by shifts at the 
international level and showcase the role of international economic and political forces in the 
environmental state development process. 
Global Environmental Regime   
Adding to this process is the influence of the growing environmental regime on China’s 
behavior. Like Germany, China’s actions at the domestic level have been significantly impacted 
by international agenda setting and a growing framework of MEA’s and international institutions 
which have worked to shape China’s political and economic rise. While China has not 
historically been a lead state in international environmental treaties, its participation is still 
worthy of consideration. Looking back to the origins of the environmental state in China, some 
of the first national level actions regarding environmental protection were influenced by the 
growing international environmental regime.  
For example, the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 was 
effective in international agenda setting and, while China was at times confrontational in this 
setting, the real bureaucratic and policy expansion that laid the groundwork for the 
environmental state originated in large part from the influences of this conference.189 From its 
experience in Stockholm, Chinese policy makers were made aware of the complexity of 
environmental issues that were on the rise in both developed and developing countries around the 
world and, in conjunction with rising domestic conflict surrounding such issues as water 
pollution, inspired the start of modern environmental protection efforts in China; the first 
national environmental protection conference was subsequently held in China the following year 
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in 1973 and from this conference, important advancements were made in China’s regulatory and 
administrative environmental state apparatuses.190 Largely, this resulted in a period of top-down, 
command-control strategies imposed by the government aimed at mitigating end-of-pipe water 
and air pollutants, and was kicked off by the creation of the National Environmental Protection 
Agency.191 On top of this administrative expansion, knowledge based structures were created in 
order to supplement and inform the growing environmental governance apparatus such as the 
China Environmental Science Academy in 1978.192 
Following this initial period in which the international environmental regime was seen to 
have helped jumpstart Chinese environmental state growth, advancements in the regime 
increasingly guided and shaped the policy decisions of the Chinese government. As was the case 
with Germany, a major trend in the regime which guided China’s growth was that of sustainable 
development and the rising emphasis on market friendly solutions to environmental issues. The 
rise of this paradigm in global environmental politics came about for a variety of reasons, among 
which was the clash between the Global North and Global South. Many in the Global South 
(such as China) were hostile towards international efforts to curb environmentally deleterious 
growth, as they were just starting to reap the benefits of economic growth and industrialization; 
in order to accommodate the interests of both parties, a UN commission released the Brundtland 
Report in 1987, which laid out a strategy built upon sustainable development and the merging of 
market and environmental interests.193 Eventually, this led to such developments as the 
internalization of environmental issues within global financial institutions such as the WTO, 
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which created its own Committee on Trade and Environment in 1994.194 In these ways, the 
liberalization of the global environmental regime had taken hold and, as the epitome of a 
developing state rising through this global framework, China was significantly affected.  
The conference in Rio exemplified this newfound emphasis on sustainable development 
and, like Germany, China’s participation had a noticeable effect on its domestic actions. Prior to 
Rio, China was undergoing a period of political and economic opening, in which the government 
sought to move away from its previously isolationist stance and become more politically and 
economically engaged in the global community; after international condemnation following 
Tiananmen Square stalled these efforts, China viewed Rio as an opportunity to improve its 
international standing.195 Immediately following China’s involvement in this conference and its 
acceptance of the resultant Agenda 21, a shift in Chinese policy to include measures for 
sustainable development began.196 This resulted in a variety of regulatory and bureaucratic 
advancements which started with the inclusion of Agenda 21 goals into the Ninth National Five-
Year Plan.197 In order to implement the plan, China established multiple advisory bodies 
including the China Council for International Co-operation on Environment and Development 
(CCICED) in 1992 during the conference and the ACCA 21 as an administrative center in 
1993.198 Additionally, while these cases of bureaucratic growth were surely significant in this 
process, it was NEPA which took on the bulk of the responsibilities regarding the 
implementation of Agenda 21 and this was, in part, responsible for NEPA’s upgrade to SEPA in 
1998 as it added greatly to the scope of the agency’s responsibilities.199 
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Additionally, China’s position as a developing country has in some cases incentivized 
participation in the environmental regime. For example, China signed onto the Montreal Protocol 
as it included provisions for financial assistance to help phase out the use of CFC’s.200 On top of 
this, the CDM required further bureaucratic expansion as it brought together a host of 
government ministries and officials to form various boards and committees responsible for the 
approval of project requests and program implementation. Some preexisting agencies such as the 
NDRC were required to take on the duties associated with the creation of these projects (the 
NDRC was chosen as the Designated National Authority for China’s CDM which means that it 
ultimately receives and approves project applications).201 While the NDRC was tapped for this 
role in the CDM, other bodies were formed around it in order to establish an effective 
administrative structure. To oversee this structure, the National Leading Group on Climate 
Change was created in 2007 in order to ensure the overall functions of CDM in China, and under 
it, the National CDM Board and National CDM Fund Board were created, consisting of members 
of the NDRC and other bodies such as the Ministry of Finance.202 In recent years, China has 
expanded the scope of its development efforts by building off of CDM’s legacy to establish the 
Chinese Certified Emission Reduction Market as its own domestic trading scheme.203  
Adding to these efforts, the WTO has aided China’s efforts to implement sustainable 
development in line with the global regime. For instance, the institution has recognized ISO 
(International Organization for Standardization) standards which work to promote and certify 
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clean production methods and products.204 As a result, China’s accession into the WTO 
incentivized Chinese companies to follow these environmental standards and change their 
production patterns to comply with Chinese state initiatives, such as the China Environmental 
Labeling Program.205 ISO 40001 standards also specify that companies must comply with the 
domestic environmental regulations relevant to their industry.206 This then aids in China’s efforts 
to build compliance with their environmental regulatory framework, thus strengthening its 
environmental state capacity.  
Furthermore, while in the previous chapter we noted the importance of land management 
for the maintenance of legitimacy, it is mainly due to international influences that the protection 
of land resources was furthered through the establishment of protected areas. As with Germany, 
the global environmental regime added to the Chinese state responsibility of nature preservation 
through such conventions as the CBD. While protected areas had previously been established in 
China, these areas were not strictly protected and were mainly characterized by hunting and 
logging bans to protect nationally symbolic animals such as the giant panda.207 Upon signing 
onto the CBD in 1993 however, China’s commitment to these protected areas was significantly 
increased as the first major regulations regarding these areas were created, as established in the 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Nature Reserves in 1994.208 The increase in 
the regulatory framework regarding the protection of natural areas set the stage for a 
considerable increase in the size and scope of these protected areas, which today make up about 
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17% of China’s total land area.209 Following this was the Natural Forest Conservation Program 
(NFCP), established in 1998 which led to the creation of the Center for Natural Forest 
Conservation and Management and the training of over 700 forestry officials around the 
country.210 This represented a considerable devotion of resources as the state spent 500 million 
dollars in 1998 on the NFCP and increased this number to 875 million by 2000; the 
establishment of these natural areas has also provided a basis for the expansion of knowledge 
based structures as it has required the technical training of officials and local peoples for forest 
maintenance along with providing sites for learning and research.211   
IV. Conclusion  
As the world continues to undergo the process of globalization and as states are 
increasingly viewed in the context of the international community, so too must environmental 
states be analyzed in this context. While the environmental state is usually considered in terms of 
advancements made at the domestic level, we have shown in this section that these domestic 
advancements have been both shaped and caused by the international landscape. Through a 
comparison of Germany and China, the importance of energy security was noted. Both share the 
quality of being largely dependent on foreign sources of energy. From this connection, similar 
outcomes in terms of boosting domestic spending and administrative capacity to build energy 
security through green investments emerged. Likewise, Germany and China both have been 
subject to a growing international environmental regime. Motivated by efforts to emerge as 
internationally integrated states, both nations underwent significant changes to conform to the 
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new international norms and initiatives. This then helped in advancing domestic policies 
regarding industrial efficiency, land management / protection, etc.  
  In these ways, international influences have helped to steer environmental state growth in 
line with Duit’s framework of administrative, regulatory, financial and knowledge based 
structures. As shown in the example of WTO policies, these influences have also aided in 
boosting enforcement in China. Any progress in terms of enforcement in China is noteworthy, as 
a lack of enforcement is, as previously noted, a major hindrance to China’s full-fledged 
environmental state status. Viewing these states from an international perspective has therefore 
proved useful in identifying a variety of causes for environmental state growth in both China and 
Germany. On top of this, it has added to the previous chapter on political legitimacy in 
highlighting a prominent trend in this research. Specifically, this trend revolves around the 
evolution of sustainable development as a dominant theme in environmental state formation. 
This is important to note moving forward as the process of ecological modernization, kicked off 
by the advancements mentioned in this chapter and the previous chapter, will be considered in its 
role as a catalyst of environmental state formation. 
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Chapter 6: Ecological Modernization as a Catalyst for Environmental State Growth 
I. Introduction to Ecological Modernization Theory 
Relevance and Nature of Ecological Modernization Theory  
 
 From the previous chapters on civil society, political legitimacy, and international 
influences we have seen that many state led initiatives aimed at tackling environmental issues in 
Germany and China have involved policies intended to steer technological innovations and 
market-adjustments. Springing from the environmental state formation processes that the factors 
covered in the previous chapters have produced, these developments point to the growing role 
that ecological modernization has played in both states. As such, ecological modernization has 
been inherently intertwined throughout the dynamics we have covered so far and must be further 
considered in our analysis. By providing more clarity on what ecological modernization actually 
is and how it has played out in Germany and China, more environmental state effects will be 
uncovered and this then will help to shed more light on the reasons as to why similar outcomes 
have been noted between both states.   
First, in order to fully understand the ability of ecological modernization theory to 
explain the similarities in German and Chinese environmental state development, we must delve 
further into the the history and nature of this theory. In short, this theory is built upon the idea 
that environmental protection does not have to run counter to capitalist, market forces of growth 
and consumption; as a result, it has been described by many as essentially a “green capitalist” 
theory.212 It identifies the environment not as a hindrance to economic development but rather as 
a new economic arena in which innovation, jobs, profits, and new markets can be found.213 In 
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these ways, it is an analytical framework aimed at describing the efforts of industrialized nations 
in solving their environmental issues. Its history as a sociological theory goes back to the early 
1980’s in Germany, making it especially relevant to this study.214    
Specifically, the theory is focused on social and institutional changes in states related to 
environmental governance. A main concern of the theory is industrial adaptation as it sees this as 
the best way to solve our current environmental crises, however the role of the government is 
also critical as policy is considered a key driver of this type of change.215 These modifications 
can be framed by five key assumptions or predictions of an ecologically modernizing state: (1) 
the role of science and technological advancements will change and become looked to as 
solutions to environmental degradation rather than as causes of these issues, (2) a strengthened 
relationship between market forces/actors and environmental protection efforts, (3) changes in 
the role and character of the nation state including more decentralized governance/management, 
(4) social movements becoming more central to environmental governance, (5) fundamental 
shifts in national beliefs regarding the relationship between the environment and the economy, so 
that neither is looked to as the sole area of importance.216 These predictions will be important to 
consider moving forward.  
Analyzing the Influence of Ecological Modernization in Environmental State Formation 
While the relevance that ecological modernization has maintained throughout our study 
so far has been made clear, it is important now to highlight some of the ways in which this 
process can drive environmental state growth. As a dominant discourse in environmental politics 
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today, the historical expansion of its influence goes back decades as is evident in the 
environmental policy development of a range of actors from European states to Asian countries 
such as Japan, along with organizations such as the then European Community (EC).217 
Therefore, at the same time that the initial steps many states were taking to deal with their 
environmental problems, states were also laying the groundwork for a political and economic 
environment conducive to eco-modernization. In this way, ecological modernization has pushed 
in many developed states to further industrial development, growth and innovation.218 While this 
may seem like a dependency on the private sector, a successful implementation of eco-
modernization strategies depends upon a significant regulatory framework aimed at steering the 
desired results in such areas as renewables, biotech and other innovative sectors of the 
economy.219 
The extent to which these advancements are made can broadly be categorized as either 
weak or strong ecological modernization. Weak eco-modernization is mainly a basic form of the 
political and economic changes that we have reviewed so far. In this form, there are rudimentary 
policy initiatives aimed at incentivizing the industrial and economic practices which allow for 
more efficient and environmentally friendly modes of production and consumption.220 Strong 
eco-modernization differs in that it implies a more concerted effort by the state to change 
existing economic, social and political systems so that they are more sustainable and 
environmentally conscious.221 In this way, it is more strictly aligned with the five assumptions 
noted earlier, especially insofar as it implies discursive advancements within government and 
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society which tie the environment and the economy as codependent interests.222 In both weak 
and strong eco-modernization however, you would see at least some level of expansion among 
the four components of Duit’s environmental state framework, as eco-modernization in general 
requires regulation, money, some sort of administrative oversight, and knowledge based 
structures that aid in innovation. 
Ecological modernization as a widespread outlook in environmental politics is therefore, 
an important factor to consider in the creation of today’s environmental states. As such, the role 
it has played in both Germany and China will be compared. As was done with the factors 
covered in the previous chapters, the link between ecological modernization and the 
environmental state in each case will be shown. This will be accomplished through the 
application of the theory’s five previously mentioned assumptions to policies and initiatives 
enacted within the German and Chinese states. A key area of consideration in this application 
will be industrial advancements as eco-modernization is based on the presumption of green 
industry growth. As such, economic actors will be a major aspect of analysis, specifically in 
regards to efforts at increasing the efficiency of industrial output and economic activity, along 
with the growth of new, green industries. This will be done in conjunction with a consideration 
of broader social impacts of ecological modernization such as changing perspectives and the 
adapting roles of social movements and government.  
From the application of these assumptions, the presence of ecological modernization as 
an influential factor in each state’s environmental policy will be identified. The results of this 
relationship, borne out through such indicators as legislative advancements, devotion of funds 
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and bureaucratic growth, will then show the explanatory value of ecological modernization in 
environmental state growth. Building off of the previous chapters, we will now further identify 
the extent to which both China and Germany have undertaken ecological modernization and the 
effects that this has had on strengthening their environmental state structures. We will do so both 
in the context of these effects as results of previously explained processes and as, in and of 
themselves, catalysts for further environmental state expansion.  
II. Ecological Modernization and German Environmental State Development 
Evidence of Ecological Modernization’s Influence in Germany  
 As will be explained, many of the attributes that Germany and China share today as 
environmental states point to similar origins in ecological modernization. These origins however, 
go back further in Germany than they do in China. An example of this can be seen in the 
inclusion of the precautionary principle (Vorsorgeprinzip) into German environmental policy in 
the 1970’s. Essentially, the precautionary principle advocates for multiple changes to existing 
environmental policy including the early detection of and responses to environmental issues (as 
opposed to reactionary measures taken after the fact), along with state promotion of and 
investment in pollution cutting technological adaptations.223 In this interpretation of the 
precautionary principle, multiple assumptions of ecological modernization theory can be 
identified. For instance, this can be seen in the focus on preventative rather than reactionary 
policy measures as, looking back to the key assumptions of ecological modernization theory 
highlighted by Mol, this focus aligns with the fifth assumption of changing perceptions. 
Furthermore, “pollution prevention pays” has been noted to be a major theme of ecological 
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modernization and is related to the value of precautionary policies in preventing future costs.224 
The prevalence of such an idea in the precautionary principle thus underscores the role that 
ecological modernization has played in these policy changes, as the inherent cost savings 
therefore exemplify the merging of the economic and environmental realms and the end of the 
dichotomy in which one was thought to be dominant over the other.  
 While it is clear that the inclusion of the precautionary principle in the guiding outlooks 
of German policy demonstrates the influence of ecological modernization theory, more must be 
uncovered in order to highlight its explanatory value in German environmental state growth. For 
example, the influence of the precautionary principle in German climate and air pollution policy 
gives more necessary insight into the role that ecological modernization has played as a response 
to factors mentioned in previous chapters. This was seen through the adoption of precautionary 
policy measures following both the oil price crises of 1973 and 1979 and increase of acid rain 
that resulted in the onset of political debate surrounding air pollution control and the subsequent 
adoption of precautionary policy measures.225 As a result, the 1980’s saw the introduction of 
groundbreaking policies which brought about the rise of new technologies and an “abatement 
industry”, the inclusion of a risk-averse strategy into mainstream political discourse, and 
evidence of higher employment and industrial modernization.226 As such, with the precautionary 
principle as a dominant force in German policy making, green growth driven by technological 
adaptations has not only been Germany’s response to international and domestic pressures but 
has also been influential in its own right through the new markets and economic opportunities 
that it created.  
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 A major tactic in this eco-modernization strategy can be seen through eco-innovation 
initiatives (which are widespread throughout the European Union). Eco-innovation, defined as 
“any innovation that reduces the use of natural resources and decreases the release of harmful 
substances across the whole life-cycle” has been measured by an index which offers an aggregate 
of five sub-indexes, those being socioeconomic outcomes (employment, exports, etc.), resource 
efficiency outcomes (levels of resource use and emissions productions), eco-innovation inputs 
(investments), eco-innovation activities (levels of company participation), and eco-innovation 
outputs (patents, literature, media, etc.).227 Germany has been a leader in Europe according to 
this index as it has ranked consistently within the lead group of states, even topping this group as 
the highest ranked eco-innovator state in 2016.228 
Country Eco-Innovation Index Score 
2016 
Germany  140 
Luxembourg  139 
Finland 137 
Denmark 126 
Sweden 115 
United Kingdom 110 
 
Table 6.1: Eco-Innovation Index Scores for European States.229 
Aside from simply precautionary measures aimed at making industrial growth less  
harmful and prevent further degradation, Germany has sought eco-modernization for competitive 
purposes. This motivation has been seen through the expanding opportunities in new markets 
throughout the world. For example, Germany has made a concerted effort through such 
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initiatives as the High-Tech Strategy started in 2006 to become a lead state in technologies 
relating to solar energy, water management, resource efficiency and brownfield management.230 
As a result of this focus on the economic opportunities associated with ecological modernization, 
Germany has seen success in the growing international market for environmental technologies. 
In 2006 (even before furthering its commitment through such programs as the High-Tech 
Strategy) Germany accounted for 16.1% of the global market share of environmental 
technologies, while competitors such as the US and Japan accounted for 14.9% and 9.2% 
respectively.231 This then adds another dimension to the influence of ecological modernization 
Germany, as green development is becoming not only a practical means of environmental 
protection but also an important part of Germany’s broader economic goals.   
 With these developments in mind, it is clear that ecological modernization has had a long 
history of influence in Germany. The precautionary principle was grounded in what would later 
become core aspects of the newly developed theory in the 80’s, and Germany then embarked on 
a path of technological innovation in order to further the goal of sustainable growth so that it 
may deal with its environmental issues in an economically feasible and lucrative way. Following 
this relationship, the focus must now shift to the effects that these developments have had on 
Germany’s environmental state growth.  
Effects on the German Environmental State 
 As ecological modernization has been a pervasive theme in Germany’s fight for 
environmental protection, its development in Germany has been intertwined with that of the 
environmental state’s. For example, Germany’s eco-modernization efforts have aided in the 
strengthening of its environmental laws and regulatory framework. In 1991, the Electricity Feed-
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In Act (StrEG) came into effect, introducing for the first time in Germany a feed-in tariff system 
through which government would help to support the costs of investing in renewable energy … 
232 The Recycling and Waste Management Act of 1994 incentivized the increased recycling and 
efficient use of resources while the Renewable Energies act of 2000 was critical in building the 
use of green energy in electricity production.233 1996 also saw the Closed Substance Cycle and 
Waste Management Act which has become a model for landmark green development legislation 
in other states, such as the Circular Economy Promotion Law in China (more on this later).234  
A strengthened legal framework has been followed by substantial increases in state 
funding towards environmental innovation and industrial greening. As pointed to earlier, the 
influence of precautionary policies grounded in ecological modernization was critical in 
establishing an “abatement industry” centered on increased research and development of 
pollution cutting technologies. This was seen between 1974 and 1982 when public R&D funding 
for renewable energy increased from 20 million to 300 million DM.235 Likewise, between 1979 
and 1985, environmental related R&D increased to 3.1 percent of total public R&D expenditures 
in Germany, highlighting a growing trend of increased public investments made towards green 
industry.236 In 2008, the amount of funding that went towards environmental and energy R&D 
equaled 0.5% of Germany’s GDP, as compared to the EU average of 0.4%; “cleantech” projects, 
largely focused on green energy technologies, received a total of 724.12 million euro’s in 
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funding between 2007 and 2009, and at that time employed over 300,000 people.237 Through 
such investments of public funds, the German government has played an active role in the 
management of sustainable development.  
  In conjunction with this increased funding, bureaucratic expansion has resulted in order 
to effectively oversee the efforts to eco-modernize Germany. Going back to 1993, this trend was 
seen in the creation of the Agency for Renewable Resources (Fachagentur Nachwachsende 
Rohstoffe – FNR), which today has a staff of about 120 and oversees projects in support of 
renewable resource research and development under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture (Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft – BMEL).238 
Bureaucratic growth was further seen in 2007 when the German Material Efficiency Agency was 
created to support the improvement of companies’ material efficiency; yet another agency, the 
German Mineral Resources Agency (Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe – 
DERA), was created for supporting research and technological advancements to ensure 
sustainable development and resource use.239 
 On top of this, the inclusion of environmental concerns into state functions like tax 
collection has resulted from the increasing influence of ecological modernization in Germany. A 
prime example of this is the Ecological Tax Reform Act passed in 1999 by the Green-SPD 
coalition government of that time. 240 While there were many reasons for the introduction of this 
new ‘eco-tax’, the main considerations of advocates were the decrease in fossil fuel consumption 
and subsequent incentives for green innovation in German industry that it would create.241 The 
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effects of this tax almost immediately became evident as it aided in reducing consumption of 
certain types of fossil fuel use and incentivizing the use of green technologies to…For example, 
the introduction of the tax was followed by the first sustained trend of decreasing gasoline 
consumption in Germany (consumption decreased by 4.5% in 2000 compared to 1999 and by 3% 
in 2001 and 3.3% in 2002) which was coupled with the production of and increased demand for 
more fuel efficient vehicles (between 1998 and 2007, the average liters per 100km used by 
German cars decreased from 8.6 to 7.6 respectively; 63% of German participants in a study 
conducted by the Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung, a major consumer research organization, 
were influenced by higher gasoline prices in their purchasing decisions for new cars).242 
Therefore, while the overall effectiveness of this tax alone has been debated, it has clearly aided 
in increasing the role of the environment the collection of revenue by the German state.  
III. Ecological Modernization and Chinese Environmental State Development 
Evidence of Ecological Modernization’s Influence in China  
 In the previous case it was seen that the historical roots of ecological modernization as a 
sociological theory originated in Germany and the effects of its influence can therefore, be traced 
back earlier in time. In contrast, the influence of this theory in China can be considered to have 
taken hold more recently and will require a consideration of more modern developments in the 
Chinese government. For this case, these considerations will mainly focus on rhetoric 
surrounding the ecological civilization and its means of implementation. This analysis will be 
similar to that of Germany’s in its focus on industry.  
                                                          
Perspective: A Multidisciplinary Approach. By Dana M. Elzey and Manuela Achilles. Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 91-103. Web. 
242 Ludewig, Damian, Bettina Meyer, and Kai Schlegelmilch. Greening the Budget: Pricing Carbon and Cutting Energy  
Subsidies to Reduce the Financial Deficit in Germany. Publication. Washington DC: Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2010. 
Web. 
111 
 
 Starting with the idea of an ecological civilization, the basis of ecological modernization 
theory can be seen to have worked its way into the goals and decision making processes that 
guide Chinese governance. What is an ecological civilization? The idea of this concept as a 
guiding principle of Chinese policy was introduced in 2007 and is described as “…the ultimate 
amalgamation of socialism, harmonious society, welfare, development and a sustainable 
approach to environmental resources.”243 Some believe that the ecological civilization offers a 
rebuke of capitalism and is instead a vision of postindustrial, eco-socialist society.244 This belief 
does not hold up however, when the rhetoric surrounding the ecological civilization and the 
methods of its implementation are compared to the main tenants of ecological modernization. 
Much of the conversation regarding the ecological civilization is focused on the bridging the gap 
between economic and environmental goals and creating a paradigm of sustainable growth. 
Development is not looked to as a hindrance but rather something that must be greened and such 
terms as sustainable growth and green goods are commonly used in relation to this concept;245 
this rhetoric is key as it highlights the green capitalist mantra of ecological modernization.  
Furthermore, the efforts of the Chinese government to implement the ecological 
civilization fit in well with the ecological modernization model. This can be seen, for instance, in 
the central role that the concept of a circular economy has played in implementation policies.246 
Essentially, the idea of a circular economy is based upon the notion that methods of production 
should become more sustainable and efficient in its use of resources. This is accomplished 
through such advancements as improved recycling methods and technology. In many ways, as 
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others have noted, the main principles of ecological modernization are embedded in the idea of a 
circular economy.247 A major goal of the circular economy has been to increase the efficiency of 
energy use in relation to overall economic activity. This is seen through the decrease of energy 
consumption in relation to GDP. For example, in the first three quarters of 2018, total energy 
consumption per unit of GDP decreased by 3.1% as compared with the previous year.248 This 
highlights the continuation of a larger trend of increasing efficiency in the Chinese economy; 
from 2000 to 2017, total energy consumption per unit of GDP (tce / 10000 yuan) fell from 1.47 
to 0.57.249  
Expanding upon this measurement of energy efficiency for the economy, the government 
has adopted multiple indicator systems to measure the implementation of the circular economy 
and the construction of the ecological civilization. A primary example of this is the index of 
circular economy development established by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). This 
index takes into account four main indicators, those being waste and emissions intensity, waste 
and pollution treatment, resource intensity of GDP, and waste recycling; these indicators are 
each composed of many other sub-indicators that are taken together to quantify progress in these 
four main categories, which are then compiled themselves into a single CE (circular economy) 
index value.250 Data compiled between 2005 and 2013 for this index is shown in the following 
table and exemplifies the recent growth of the circular economy in China based off of 
improvements in the indicators relative to 2005.  
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Year Waste and 
Emissions 
Intensity Index 
Waste and 
Pollution 
Treatment 
Index 
Waste 
Recycling 
Index 
Resource 
Intensity of 
GDP Index 
CE 
Development 
Index 
2005 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2006 109.2 107.4 102.0 103.4 105.4 
2007 115.6 123.2 103.7 109.5 111.9 
2008 122.7 136.8 108.0 113.8 118.5 
2009 129.9 146.5 112.2 116.3 123.9 
2010 136.0 160.9 115.2 121.6 130.2 
2011 130.0 163.7 113.9 123.8 129.2 
2012 136.8 169.1 112.3 129.2 133.2 
2013 146.5 174.6 108.2 134.7 137.6 
 
Table 6.2: Indicators of CE Development in China. 251 
 
 The rhetoric supporting the rise of the ecological civilization in China and the focus on 
such phenomena as the growth of a circular economy therefore, offer evidence of the presence 
and influence of ecological modernization in China. The establishment of the CE development 
index and its significant increase between 2005 and 2013 for instance, shows the merging of 
economic and environmental imperatives along with the increased role of economic actors in the 
management of such environmental issues as pollution, as it highlights the fundamental belief in 
green growth. Additionally, the key role that technology plays in increasing the efficiency of 
industrial activity and the management of wastes is a critical factor in the circular economy and 
ecological civilization.252 Furthermore, looking back to Chapter 3, civil society organizations 
focused on environmental issues have been allowed to grow in China but only to the extent that 
they have been helpful to the government in enforcing regulations on polluters. As such, while it 
is still clear that there has not been a bottom-up, grassroots push for environmental state 
developments, the actions of the government can be seen from a top-down approach to have 
enhanced the role of social movements in environmental governance to its own benefit. The 
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following table sums up the connections made between the ecological civilization in China and 
ecological modernization. 
Ecological Modernization Ecological Civilization 
Importance of science and technology Key role of technology in increasing energy 
efficiency of economic activity, reducing / managing 
pollution, and allowing for green growth 
Growing relationship between economic actors and 
environmental protection 
Government policy used to influence companies  
companies take a lead role in improving 
environmental quality  
Changes to state organization; more decentralized Cooperation between many state organizations for 
greening initiatives; local influence over policies such 
as env. tax 
Social movements more active in environmental 
governance 
Role of the public as watchdogs, aiding in compliance 
of env. regulations 
 
Perceptions of economy and environment as 
intertwined social realms 
Reconciles economic and environmental imperatives 
 
Table 6.3: Overlap Between Ecological Modernization and the Ecological Civilization  
 
 As with Germany, the presence of ecological modernization in China can clearly be seen. 
With the growth of a circular economy emphasizing industrial efficiency / greening, along with 
the broader initiative of ecological civilization construction, the core tenants of ecological 
modernization are clearly evident in the growing efforts to merge environmental protection and 
economic development. The legal and bureaucratic frameworks that have emerged to help in this 
process will now be looked to in order to uncover the effects that this has had on China’s 
environmental state.  
Effects on Chinese Environmental State Growth 
An example of the effect that this has had on China’s environmental state can be seen in 
the passage of the Environmental Protection Tax Law in 2018. This law was a goal of the 
government going back to 2010 and finds its roots in the government’s attempts to supplement 
its command and control regulations with economic incentives for increased industrial 
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innovation to boost efficiency and reduce pollutants.253 While the older system of pollution 
discharge fees did produce considerable funds for the state (about 2.5 billion dollars in revenue 
from 280,000 companies in 2015) pollution discharge fees were collected by the environmental 
protection authorities and compliance was lacking; under the new law, the revenue is collected 
by the tax authority which carries with it stricter enforcement measures.254 The establishment of 
this tax also highlights a decentralization of environmental management as more authority is 
given to the local levels in terms of setting tax rates (for water pollution, a range of tax rates set 
by the law is .202 to 2.02 dollars per unit of pollution, while for air pollution the range is .173 to 
1.73 dollars per unit of pollution) so that the different conditions of each province are taken into 
account which, along with the shift in revenue collection to the tax authority, aids in 
enforcement.255 The idea that China is more of a nascent environmental state is grounded in a 
lack of local enforcement; while the central government has made significant improvements, this 
has not been reflected throughout country as it has in other environmental states. Because of this, 
the role of this law in increasing enforcement and tying environmental issues with a core state 
function of revenue production is a promising sign of growth for China, one driven by ecological 
modernization.  
Furthermore, to further the cause of sustainable growth and a circular economic 
paradigm, a number of regulatory and bureaucratic advancements have been made. This can be 
seen, for instance, in the Circular Economy Promotion Law. Taking effect on January 1st, 2009, 
this law makes clear its eco-modernization origins by stating in the General Principles, “The 
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development of a circular economy shall be propelled by the government, led by the market, 
effected by enterprises and participated in by the public….under the precondition of being 
technically feasible, economically rational, and good for saving resources.”256 This was not the 
first law with the purpose of incentivizing a circular economy. Before the term was introduced in 
1998, similar initiatives were implemented which sought a “comprehensive utilization of 
resources”, as seen through the Regulations on Strengthening the Comprehensive Utilization of 
Resources passed in 1985 and the Energy Conservation Law of the People’s Republic of China 
in 1997.257 Eventually, the circular economy became an explicit goal of policy, as the term was 
introduced formally by Chinese scholars in 1998 and, in the same year, SEPA was upgraded to 
ministerial status and soon adopted the circular economy as a strategy to help deal with 
previously ineffective environmental protection efforts.258 This then led to laws such as the 
Renewable Energy Law in 2005 and Circular Economy Promotion law in 2015 which worked to 
make environmental protection a central issue within the manufacturing cycle, so that waste 
materials are either reused or recycled and energy efficiency is built.259 
The evolution of the legal framework surrounding circular economic development also 
resulted in increased cooperation between bureaucratic bodies. Again, enforcement and 
compliance have long plagued the Chinese environmental state; these issues have largely been 
driven by a lack of authority and weak coordination between government organizations.260 
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Previously SEPA’s responsibility, the NDRC in 2004 took the lead on the management of 
circular economy implementation programs and this was followed by more comprehensive 
action plans, such as the Opinions on Accelerating Circular Economy Development issued by the 
State Council in 2005.261 In accordance with this push to accelerate circular economy 
construction efforts, the National Action Scheme for Pilot Programs for Promoting Circular 
Economy was jointly created by the National Development and Reform Commission, the State 
Environmental Protection Administration, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry 
of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce, and the National Bureau of Statistics; further evidence of 
the growth of interagency cooperation can be found in the Catalogue of Waste Electrical and 
Electronic Products for Disposal issued in 2010 by the NDRC, MEP, and the Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology, along with the Circular on Investment and Financing 
Policies and Measures Supporting Circular Economy Development announced in 2010 by the 
NDRC, People’s Bank of China, the China Banking Regulatory Commission, and the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission.262 These examples highlight the many steps that China has 
taken to build a circular economy and ecological civilization. Thus, the influence of ecological 
modernization in growing a robust regulatory framework and increasing bureaucratic capacity 
can be seen.  
Finally, an important step forward in China’s environmental state development came in 
the form of a constitutional amendment as a result of ecological modernization. That amendment 
came on March 11, 2018 which marked the inclusion of the term ecological civilization into the 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. While the term was already a part of the CPC’s 
constitution, it was not until 2018 that an amendment was added which specifically included it in 
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the PRC Constitution. This amendment, the fifth since the adoption of the PRC Constitution, 
includes in Article 46, “to direct and administer economic affairs and urban and rural 
development, as well as the building of an ecological civilization.”263 As noted in our 
environmental state definition, the inclusion of environmental considerations into the 
constitution of a state is a fundamental precondition to environmental state status as it sets up the 
legal basis for necessary for the legislative advancements required for such an achievement. In 
this case, it bolsters the legal framework for a regulatory system conducive to green development 
and will help to ensure further advances in line with those mentioned in this section.264 In this 
way, another building block has been added to the foundation of China’s environmental state, 
driven by the ecological civilization and the underlying ecological modernization imperatives.  
IV. Conclusion 
In both Germany and China there has been a significant emphasis placed on the greening 
of economic activity. In this way, ecological modernization has established itself as a dominant 
paradigm in each state’s growing environmental protection obligations. Striking similarities can 
be seen in the goals of Germany and China to tackle their environmental issues in large part 
through the greening of industrial practices. As ecological modernization theory predicts, the 
states have pushed such developments as technological innovation efficient production methods 
to achieve these goals; this has resulted in environmental state growth. Germany saw a direct 
relationship between eco-modernization initiatives and bureaucratic growth, devotion of public 
funds, and the strengthening of its environmental legislative / regulatory framework. Likewise, 
China saw a strengthening of its bureaucracy, fundamental legal advancements through 
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constitutional amendments, and the greening of its tax revenue. In these ways ecological 
modernization has played an important role the story of Germany and China’s environmental 
states.  
By comparing the process of eco-modernization in each state, it can be considered to 
have been more influential in the German case. For example, ecological modernization’s longer 
history and theoretical roots in Germany point to the dominance of this body of thought as a 
motivation in Germany’s environmental protection efforts. Adding to this is the more rigid 
nature of German policy making as it is strongly aligned and consistent with its basic principles, 
such as the precautionary principle.265 With this representation of ecological modernization 
engrained in German policy, ecological modernization has and will continue to carry significant 
weight in German environmental state considerations. In contrast, the effects of eco-
modernization pointed to in this chapter were largely seen in more recent years; many 
developments were made in the late 90’s and after the year 2000 while in Germany they go back 
to the 80’s and in some cases the 70’s.  
At the same time, it is important to explain that while eco-modernization may have 
carried more intellectual weight in Germany, in both cases I would argue that strong eco-
modernization has been pursued. For example, throughout this study we have seen how the 
economic systems, though not changed in their fundamental structures, have been reorganized to 
accommodate eco-modernization. The concept of the ecological civilization in China exemplifies 
these cultural and economic shifts while in Germany we have shown that German policy, with 
the precautionary principle as one of its guiding doctrines, has developed a relatively holistic 
approach to initiating processes of eco-modernization. Providing a manifestation of these shifts 
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in the German case, the Energiewende described in Chapter 5, while resulting in part from a 
variety of international pressures, has been implemented in line with the tenants of ecological 
modernization and represents significant a significant transformation in the priorities and 
functions of economic and political structures.  
From our analysis on civil society in Germany, the fact that these outcomes are indicative 
of strong eco-modernization can in part be attributed to the exclusive nature of the state. As we 
noted in Chapter 3, the passively exclusive attitude that the German government had towards the 
environmental movement resulted in the persistence of an oppositional force in society. The 
remanence of this force has been pointed to as a key factor in the outcome of strong rather than 
weak eco-modernization as the persistence of protest and social unrest maintained enough 
pressure to push for stronger eco-modernization measures.266 The latter, for example, can be 
found in the case of Norway which, in contrast the German case, showcases an actively inclusive 
policy structure which has largely coopted the environmental movement and eliminated the 
presence of any strong oppositional force.267 In Germany, therefore, we can see that through the 
specific context in which civil society operated, along with the influences of the legitimacy 
imperative and the international landscape, strong eco-modernization as described in this chapter 
has come as a result of the environmental state effects covered in the previous chapters. On top 
of this, it has, in its own right, helped to drive the country’s environmental state development 
through its win-win approach that attaches an economic incentive to environmental management. 
In the case of China, we have seen that the authoritarian regime of the state kept such an 
oppositional force from growing. As such, this factor was not as prominent as it was in the 
German case. Despite this, the fact that strong eco-modernization has been pursued by the 
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Chinese government can be attributed to the difference in the nature of political legitimacy in the 
state. The fragility of Chinese legitimacy, as described in Chapter 4, means that the legitimacy 
imperative in China carried more weight than it did in Germany in relation to environmental 
concerns. Therefore, while civil society itself was not strong enough to insert environmental 
concerns into core state goals, the incentive to maintain and build political legitimacy was 
powerful enough to help necessitate a response that ultimately culminated in the strong eco-
modernization tactics that we have seen in this chapter. This makes sense, as these efforts would 
be economically opportunistic and would work to solve the major issues threatening social 
stability such as air pollution, thus providing a balance between two of the main components of 
the CCP’s legitimacy, those being quality of life and economic growth. As such, the same 
fundamental results were seen, as environmental concerns became a key aspect of the 
government’s attempt to control social unrest and maintain political authority. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
I. Understanding Processes of Environmental State Formation  
Major Findings and Conclusions 
 Through this comparative analysis of Germany and China, processes of environmental 
state formation have been highlighted which are critical for future studies of the environmental 
state. By first comparing civil society as a factor, we have shown that civil society growth has 
been successfully hindered in China and therefore cannot be considered to have the same 
explanatory value as it can in the German case; in Germany, a vibrant and influential 
environmental movement has been allowed to grow as the state has not actively worked to hinder 
its advance. In this way, our analysis of civil society helped in framing the overarching questions 
of this study, which were:  
3) Why have both China and Germany achieved environmental state status when one 
lacks a civil society capable of forming a unified and effective environmental 
movement?  
4) More broadly, what factors allow for environmental state development in both 
democratic and authoritarian regimes?  
  At the same time, by giving an overview of the political opportunity structures in which 
civil society operated in each state, an underlying similarity was noted. Even though the German 
government was not actively exclusive in its attitude towards civil society it was, like China, 
exclusive in its policy making process. Because of this, the importance of state legitimation 
imperatives in this context was raised as a point of concern. Therefore, this chapter identified the 
first major finding of the study. While an influential environmental movement was only found in 
the German case, both states shared a trait that necessitated an exploration of state legitimacy.  
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By analyzing the nature of political legitimacy in Germany and China, we were then able 
to draw more significant conclusions in regards to each nation’s environmental state growth. In 
Germany, where political legitimacy rests on the ability of democratic institutions to function as 
expected, the exclusive nature of the state helped to ignite enough opposition within civil society 
to call into question the ability of these institutions to meet public expectations. Ultimately, this 
resulted in the formation of the Green Party which, especially under its coalition government, 
was able to pressure other parties to take on environmental platforms, influence the policy 
process from the inside, and effectively tie environmental concerns with state legitimacy. In 
China, where legitimacy rests not on institutions but on the ability of the state to improve quality 
of life, the process was different but had essentially the same results. While civil society was not 
able to form a unified movement and influence the state, slowing economic growth and scattered 
but substantial social unrest resulting from high levels of pollution were enough to cause a 
greater crisis of legitimacy than was seen in Germany. This more vulnerable model of legitimacy 
was key in putting enough pressure on the Chinese government to take substantial action even 
without a fully developed civil society. 
Turning to the international level, we showed how influences from beyond the borders of 
each state helped to aid and in some cases initiate environmental state development. Specifically, 
dependence on foreign energy sources and the agenda setting in the global environmental regime 
impacted both of our cases in ways that transcended their fundamental differences. Germany and 
China both had insufficient domestic energy supplies and as a result were subjected to forces that 
impacted their own efforts to maintain national security, a responsibility shared by democratic 
and authoritarian regimes alike. Likewise, both states shared the common goal of integration into 
the global community following periods of isolation due a variety of historical factors. Partaking 
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in the growing environmental regime was a strategy of their attempts at integration and the 
exposure to a variety of international linkages caused significant domestic changes, specifically 
in the direction of sustainable development. This aspect particularly is more significant in the 
German case, as the state is more directly affected by the influence of organizations like the EU.  
In considering both of these factors and the ways in which they drove environmental state 
growth, similar outcomes began to appear. Because many of these outcomes were grounded in 
principles of sustainable development and focused on such advancements as industrial efficiency 
and technological adaptability, ecological modernization became a binding force between these 
two cases. An explanation for this (as touched upon in Chapter 1) is that ecological 
modernization is a useful tool for merging environmental concerns with legitimation and 
economic imperatives. John Barry and Robyn Eckersley, authors referenced in the literature 
review of this thesis, explain this by describing ecological modernization as a process that, 
“…serves the legitimation imperative of states, providing an ecological dimension to the modern 
state’s crisis management function” and (quoting Christoff) is, “…‘a discursive strategy useful to 
governments seeking to manage ecological dissent and to relegitimize their social regulatory 
role.’”268 Ecological modernization then came as a primary result of legitimacy maintenance in 
each state, specifically in its strong form due to the strength of civil society in the German case 
and the higher risk of a legitimacy crisis in the Chinese case.  
Therefore, political legitimacy and international influences both played a key role in 
kicking off environmental state formation and initiating processes of ecological modernization. 
Eco-modernization then helped to catalyze the environmental state growth process. This process 
can be visualized in Figure 7.1. While considering this process, it is important to remember that 
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each of the theories should be considered individually at the same time as they are considered 
together as a unified model. This is because of the varying levels of influence that each factor 
had depending on the different state structures and regime characteristics present in each case. In 
fact, as we have just summarized, it is partly because of the fact that factors effected each state to 
different extents that similar outcomes were able to be produced (the legitimacy imperative being 
greater in China resulting in state action). At the same time, they should be considered together 
as they all overlap to form a model through which processes of environmental state creation can 
be analyzed.  
 
Figure 7.1: Process of Environmental State Formation 
Shortcomings and Suggestions for Future Research 
Additionally, it is important to note that through our focus on ecological modernization 
we mainly focus on technological adaptations to counter industrial pollutants and energy 
inefficiency and do not necessarily cover such issues as land management.269 This why it is 
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important to consider the legitimacy and international factors not only in the way that they lead 
to ecological modernization but also in the ways that they contribute to the environmental state 
on their own, through such developments as nature preserves.   
One of the shortcomings of this study however, was that a wide range of topics was 
covered in order to shed light on the larger process of environmental state creation. For future 
study, each of these topics can be further researched and expanded upon. For example, the 
relationship between MEA’s and environmental state growth can be more systematically 
explored, along with other international linkages such as the effects of the EU on environmental 
state capacity. These more direct studies would be helpful as many of the environmental state 
results given in each chapter of this thesis had some level of overlap. For example, increased 
R&D funding was attributed to both energy independence initiatives and legitimacy maintenance 
in China. Additionally, because the concept of the environmental state is relatively new and 
unexplored, the literature surrounding these topics and comparative analysis in general has been 
quite sparse. As the environmental state undergoes more scrutiny and as the literature expands, 
more models and frameworks for comparing their development across a wide range of cases can 
be crafted. 
Another shortcoming that could be addressed in future studies is the effectiveness of this 
type of environmental state growth. While from this perspective, we have seen why and how 
Germany and China have both been effective in building up their environmental state capacities, 
it was not within the scope of this study to consider whether or not these advancements have 
truly been successful in holistically managing their environmental issues. Much of our focus was 
on more blatant issues such as land management, air / water pollution and climate change. Put 
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simply, holistic environmental management is much more nuanced than this. This is especially 
important to keep in mind as our analysis pointed to ecological modernization as a main theme 
and catalyst of environmental state growth.  
Skeptics of ecological modernization see it as essentially a coping strategy by 
governments intended on creating better but not necessarily adequate environmental 
management initiatives.270 These critics argue that ecological modernization simply perpetuates 
the industrial and consumer practices that have caused the world’s most pressing environmental 
issues. For example, many point to Jevons paradox which states that as resource and energy 
efficiency increase humans will simply increase their usage.271 With this critique in mind, it is 
important to remember that in this thesis processes of environmental state creation evident in 
Germany and China were explained but not justified. There have been no conclusions made as to 
whether or not the outcomes seen in both states have been entirely satisfactory or whether or not 
these represent the ideal environmental state.  
II. Implications for Other States  
The analysis conducted in this thesis has worked to show that fundamentally different  
states can still achieve environmental state status. In the absence of a unified environmental 
movement, states with authoritarian regimes that offer no or very little path for public 
participation can see the same results of environmental state growth as seen in those with 
democratic regimes due to the influence of political legitimacy, the international landscape, and 
resultant processes of ecological modernization. From this central conclusion, the potential for 
other unlikely states to evolve into environmental states can be better analyzed. The concept of 
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an environmental state is typically applied to developed, Western democracies; our 
understanding must be expanded. This is critical moving forward as states in the Global South, 
with a diverse range of historical and political backgrounds, become ever more important actors 
in fighting international environmental issues.  
As such, the findings of this study are not only important for understanding the stories of 
Germany and China but of states around the world. Using climate change as an example, as the 
effects of this process worsen states around the world will feel the impact regardless of their 
unique characteristics. States in the Global South will especially face the worst of climate 
change’s effects as they are geographically located in areas that are most susceptible to these 
problems. States in Central and South America for instance, are at much greater risk of flooding, 
tropical storm damage, and drought than are other regions.272 Adding to this is the fact that they 
lack the financial resources, technology, knowledge and administrative capacities to respond.273 
By identifying and explaining similarities between China (a developing state) and Germany (a 
highly developed state) lessons can be taken and applied to other cases that may not be the most 
obvious candidates for future environmental state status.  
For example, as noted in Chapter 2’s literature review, environmental state characteristics 
do not always correlate with factors usually used for comparison like governmental structure 
(Ex: majoritarian vs. consensual democracy).274 In attempting to answer the questions of this 
thesis, as explained in the previous section of this chapter, the factors considered for analysis 
showed that democratic states with active environmental movements and authoritarian states 
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with no environmental movement can undergo similar developmental paths. For example, eco-
modernization’s use as a tool in legitimacy maintenance and its dominance as a form of 
discourse in the international regime give it a great deal of value in addressing environmental 
state formation across a range of contexts. Therefore, as was done in this thesis, ecological 
modernization can be looked to as both an outcome and a causal factor in studying the rise of 
other environmental states regardless of differences in regime type, civil society formation and 
economic structure.  
By better understanding how states have and are rising to meet the problems of a 
changing environment, we can better predict what states will do and better explain what states 
should do in the future. This is not only important from the perspective of environmental studies 
but also from the perspective of political science in general. As we understand more about the 
environmental state, we understand how our definitions and conceptions of the state as a political 
unit are lacking. By showing that states as different as Germany and China have been able to 
achieve environmental state status, we can explain how and why states are adapting in their core 
functions to better accommodate environmental concerns regardless of regime type, level of 
economic development or level of societal development; this then gets the bigger question of 
what a state is and what it ought to be. 
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